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Killer of Go

Technique and Preventative Measures

By Sakata Eio, Honorary Honinbo

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lishers, except for short excerpts as a part of a written review.
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tle of Go no Koroshi-ya

Photo on cover courtesy of Harry Fleener
I will teach you the way you should go;
I will instruct you and advise you.

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To Begin With...

Throughout the thirty-odd years of my career as a professional go player I have unwaveringly harbored one ambition concerning the publication of work concerning go.

Specifically, material on the opening, the middlegame, invasions, or else, life and death problems, tesuji, or, then again, a game collection, is not the framework that I have had in mind; instead, a completely new type of format. A work that can be read enjoyably, yet the reader would thereby, in the process of reading, assimilate at a single bound, a tremendous increase in aesthetic sense and power at the game. Only thus could a book satisfy my long-cherished desire.

The game of go offers boundless fascination.

If some of that limitless fascination could be communicated to the reader in an interesting way and from the standpoint of practical measures applied in real game situations... that has been my intention.

At this time, the publisher Ikeda Toshiko has responded to my wishes and after all these years I am at last able to freely fulfill my desire to my heart's content.

It is my fervent hope that the reader of "Killer of Go" will pause thoughtfully and reflect upon the idea that, well, this way of thinking, this way of playing, is a viable option, and approach his or her own game with freshly opened eyes.

Nothing equals the thrill of killing a large group of one's opponent's stones, but there are ten steps that one must master in order to understand the techniques involved, and, conversely, there is an art to knowing how it your own, using the knowledge to beat the living daylights out of your favorite go rival! I am confident that this book will open vistas in the game of go that you perhaps have never, before now, been able to contemplate and savor.

The material offered here has been assembled and edited by Messrs. Okame Sanjin and Mihori Masa. They are the ones deserving of all acclaim and gratitude.

December 1967

Sakata Eio

Table of Contents

To Begin With.....	3
I — Two Paths to a Winning Game.....	11
1- Sakata v. Shinohara game.....	19
(June 1955; Sakata plays black).....	19
2- Dosaku v. Doteki game.....	25
(1682; Doteki takes two stones).....	25
3- Dosaku v. Dosa game.....	31
(1683; Dosa plays black/fixed color).....	31
4- Jowa v. Genan game.....	36
(May 1816; Inseki plays black).....	36
5- Shusaku v. Matsujiro game.....	45
(October 1845; Shusaku plays black/fixed color).....	45
6- Shusaku v. Yuzo game.....	51
(March 1853; Shusaku plays black).....	51
7- Kitani v. Go game.....	57
(October 1940; Go plays black).....	57
8- Sakata v. Kitani game.....	62
(March 1957; Sakata plays black).....	62
9- Kitani v. Karigane game.....	68
(1928; Kitani takes two stones).....	68
10- Ohira v. X game.....	74
(June 1967; X plays black).....	74
II — "Killing Stones": Pluses and Minuses.....	79
(1) Do Not Try to Swipe the Honey.....	80
(2) Do not Celebrate too Early.....	91
(3) Beware of "Muscle-bound" Shape.....	93
11- Sakata v. Miyashita game.....	95
(June 1955; Miyashita plays black).....	95
12- Go v. Hashimoto (Utarō) game.....	102
(September 1946; Hashimoto plays black).....	102
13- Sakata v. Fujisawa (Hosai) game.....	108
(July 1961; Sakata plays black).....	108
III — Immortal Games Fully Annotated.....	113
14- Go v. Sakata game.....	115

(April 1939; Sakata plays black/ fixed color).....	115
15- Shusai v. Karigane game.....	151
IV — Killing Techniques.....	169
Section 1 Train Your Eye!.....	170
Section 2 Develop Your Reading Strength!.....	171
16- Retsugen v. Senchi game.....	173
(May 1788; Senchi plays black/fixed color).....	173
17- Shuho v. Tetsujiro game.....	176
18- Go v. Fujisawa (Hosai) game.....	179
(October 1951; Fujisawa plays black).....	179
19- Sakata v. Rin Kaiho game.....	183
(May 1967; Rin plays black).....	183
Section 3 Do Not Worry About Outward Appearances.....	186
Section 4 Destroy the Opponent's Shape.....	189
Section 5 Fatten the Calf.....	190
Section 6 Chop Apart the Opponent Happily.....	192
Section 7 Use Thickness to Win.....	194
Section 8 Fight from a Position of Strength.....	197
Section 9 Effective Use of Leaning Attacks and Two-pronged Attacks.....	199
Section 10 An Ideal Model of Ambushing.....	205
(Special Section) Mind Reading.....	206
V — Killer of Go:	
Preventative Measures.....	209
(1) Do Not Approach Strong Positions.....	213
(2) Effectively Sacrificing Positions.....	215
(3) Welcome! The Killer of Go!.....	217

Killer of Go

Technique and Preventative Measures

I — Two Paths to a Winning Game

1 - Sakata v. Shinohara game.....	19
2 - Dosaku v. Doteki game.....	25
3 - Dosaku v. Dosa game.....	31
4 - Jowa v. Genan game.....	36
5 - Shusaku v. Matsujiro game.....	45
6 - Shusaku v. Yuzo game.....	51
7 - Kitani v. Go game.....	57
8 - Sakata v. Kitani game.....	62
9 - Kitani v. Karigane game.....	68
10- Ohira v. X game.....	74

I have to begin with a word of explanation. The impulse of this book, "Killer of Go", is not to incite wholesale, indiscriminate killing of one's opponent's stones.

One kills what is there for the killing. Also, if unprotected stones are there for the taking, one is compelled to batten down the hatches and then use precision in executing the death blow. For this purpose, I would like to speak of the various and sundry techniques one must master.

And naturally, on the other side of the coin, amateur players aspiring to a higher level will necessarily want to read this book, "Killer of Go", in order to learn the best way to avoid having one's stones killed, and this matter too is addressed.

In the final analysis, there are two principal ways of winning at go. The first is to play slowly and deliberately, taking one's time and sparing no pains, something that comes naturally to the aged, something like a tree withering, in the same way as a smothering death creeps up; step by step the opponent is directed into a losing situation. For the most part, when professional players give teaching games, playing against a handicap, it is usual for them to adopt this strategy. The reason for this is that in the opening it is apparent that the handicap stones possess their greatest power and precipitating a pitched battle will be disadvantageous to white. Therefore, white will play in a restrained manner, seeking move by move, little by little, to readjust the balance of power in white's favor. In the process, the opponent typically will play lax moves or even ones that incur a minus, and it is not unusual for a handicap game to draw close in the endgame, with white winning in the late stages.

Among us professionals, the playing style of the late Takagawa Kaku was representative of this slow but steady method. Takagawa absolutely refused to resort to unsound play, and perfected the art of the long, drawn-out battle. In general, go differs from chess in that go is a game in which this kind of marathon-style strategy is appropriate. In chess, power points differ according to the pieces in play and the

game is decided when one side's king is cornered. Therefore, it is not unusual to see blitzkrieg tactics used. However, in go each stone has the same value as any other one, with the outcome decided by the overall balance across the board. An impetuous, headlong rush into battle will not necessarily lead to success. As long as one's opponent does not make an egregious mistake, there is a long way to go before one is able to kill a large group of stones; this may be considered the true nature of the game of go.

But on the other hand, occasionally, as the situation demands, an early win comes one's way. In contrast to the long, drawn-out strategy, this is the second case referred to above, which in the world of boxing would be called a knockout. In other words, elaborating on the theme of a 15 round boxing match, fighting through to the end of that 15th round, and winning a decision on points is equivalent to the drawn-out winning strategy just discussed. The second winning style does not wait until the 15th round, but lands a fatal blow in the early rounds, flattening the opponent to the mat.

It is just this kind of knockout blow that appears in go as a slaughter of one of the opponent's important groups of stones. In such cases, there are various techniques that must be mastered in order to kill a group of stones, and one must also develop the necessary playing strength. This book has been written for this purpose: the 15 round boxing match is shown to be winnable early, in the third round perhaps, or maybe it is in the fifth when matters are settled; the point is that in go the game ends with a short number of moves. Spectators are also delighted and the participants are spared a difficult endgame to play out. And with a stirring win to savor, this kind of knockout should be sought, if possible, instead of the drawn-out win.

However, one cannot always land such a knockout blow on the opponent: things do not always proceed in that kind of ideal manner. No matter how superior a "killer of go" one might be, if the opponent offers no chink in the armor one cannot kill a group of stones.

Perhaps the reader is a lover of films and can anticipate another analogy. It is in Western movies that a "professional killer" appears.

Upon a barren landscape that stretches as far as the eye can see, beneath a scorching sun, the professional killer appears as a lone, solitary figure. With a six-shooter strapped to his hip, he sits atop a powerful stallion, reigning it in while stroking a three day growth of beard. Sand is kicked up by the wind. As he drifts through a prairie town he passes a wall filled with bounty posters offering dollar rewards. "Wanted dead or alive!" "Track down the varmint!" Then he leisurely sidles up to a saloon bar and tosses down a potent slug of whiskey. A lone wolf of a man, fast as lightning on the trigger, staking his life on being quicker on the draw than anyone. This wandering loner might be a famous fugitive from Texas or a vagabond from Minnesota...

In this book we will take this familiar figure of the Western hero whose special skill is in "killing" and use the context of go to examine the matter together.

In a real sense, as one plays a game of go, one may begin with the intention of playing the first, drawn-out strategy, but if the opponent pulls no punches, playing powerful moves, one must arouse oneself as well and rise to the occasion, not backing down a single step; not infrequently this will result in an unexpected capturing race (semeai).

It is said that when an author writes a novel, the pen may take over, leading the plot line into unexpected directions, but for the author, working alone, it is an inanimate pen which drags the story along. When there is a living opponent, and especially over the go board where fighting spirit is given great consideration, the very stones may seem to acquire a life of their own, and one can be plunged unexpectedly into a melee.

There is an expression: "forced by circumstances", which we professional go players use while giving our impression of a game we have played. "That two-step hane was forced by the circumstances." This is the kind of context in which the expression appears.

Undoubtedly go is a living thing and it is not compulsory for a game to proceed in the drawn-out style or for it to be dictated that the decision be established on points in the endgame.

Related to this is the agreeable circumstance that a "killer" never knows when opportunity may knock. In boxing, the opponent may let down his guard, sticking his jaw out for an instant, offering a perfect opportunity. This is the pride and joy of the "killer": taking advantage of a momentary lapse to flatten the adversary with a powerful punch of deadly impact.

There seem to be tremendous numbers of chances like these available, especially in amateur games. One constantly sees examples of players neglecting to secure life for large groups of stones.

If a large group ends up dead like this, the game is over. However, there are any number of cases where an opponent's group has been driven to the brink of destruction only to be let off the hook and allowed live at the last moment; or perhaps an unconditionally dead group finagles its way to become ko.

Actually, in the case of amateurs, and particularly in the beginner class, there are even more opportunities to kill large groups of stones. The principal explanation for this is that beginners tend to unreasonably try to rescue heavy groups of stones from dangerous situations. In an exchange of profit and influence (furikawari) for instance, stones that end up butting against the opponent's wall are just dead weight: their usefulness has ended and should be regarded as throw-away stones. Despite this fact, there are some who will grunt, roll up their sleeves and recklessly try to drag these stones to safety. This is precisely the case in which the "killer" is given a perfect target, and just like a fattened calf, the stones are afforded every opportunity to increase in size and desirability until they are finally lead to slaughter with no quarter given. The point here is that under no circumstances should a group of heavy stones be clung onto in a misguided attempt at rescuing them. Even if they should escape by the skin of their teeth, in the process the opponent is often given

an ideal chance to build a large territorial framework (moyo). Remember the go proverb: "Knight's moves win running battles."

The next consideration is to make sure that one determines one's own move in accordance with the move of the opponent. A "killer" may aim at a vulnerable group of central stones, but immediately going for the kill may well fail due to insufficient preparation, so one tact might be to play forcing moves (kikashi) to the right, while on the left capping plays might be used. Should all of these moves be meekly answered, one may find that when the "killer" draws his pistol, that large central group of stones' escape routes have been cut. This often happens during handicap games, and if one merely responds to the stronger player's beck and call, one will never develop one's own game. One must play elsewhere (tenuki) at some point; if one can adjust one's thinking to the idea of ignoring an opponent's move, one can score a success at a single bound.

The third reason a beginner's large group of stones frequently die is that it is not uncommon for amateurs to badly misread situations.

One may be convinced that one's stones have plenty of scope for finding two eyes and is consequently lulled in the belief that no matter how one plays they will live, but when the surrounding areas are blocked, one then finds vital points being probed and that life cannot be secured. Or else, one may believe that all the stones of a group are connected, but then a stunning diagonal attachment appears from nowhere, splitting the group and leaving each of the separated portions with a single eye and death. This kind of thing happens all the time. We professional players also make mistakes in reading, so it is understandable how it can happen, but during a game the most frightening thing to contemplate is the possibility of such a misreading and the smacking of the "killer's" lips, the "killer" who has been patiently waiting for such a mistake.

The preceding discussion has explored the three principal reasons why beginners' stones can be killed. At the same time, it might be wondered whether we professionals never

have stones killed, but that is decidedly not how it is. In the case of handicap games it is often said that "Sensei's stones cannot be captured."

— With these words, it is obvious that one is unwilling to go after the white stones, but one could hardly commit a greater mistake. No matter how great a teacher of go the Sensei may be, one-eyed groups of stones cannot live, and if one discovers that sort of weak point, one must attack it relentlessly. To do so is a concrete manifestation of one's developing skill.

Of course, if one's attack misfires one is left with a position that in chess is called "exhaustion of resources", while in go it is called "over-developed shape" (*amarigatachi*); so one cannot indiscriminately attack and still expect good results. But if an opponent's stones can be killed and one avoids to do so through fear or mistrust of one's ability, nothing could reek more of cowardice. That bane of handicap go: "Sensei's stones cannot be captured," should be banished from this day forward, to be replaced by: "Set to killing Sensei's stones." I heartily recommend this courageous attitude as being the best way to approach handicap go.

Among amateur players and then again, also in games between amateur and professional players, these circumstances prevail, but when considering the situation of professionals playing each other, the death of large groups of stones is quite an uncommon occurrence. Typically, professionals will read out life and death questions deeply before making a move, and if there is a suspicion that some stones may die, there is no attempt to cling to them: they are abandoned while the loss is small, and compensation is sought in an exchange (*furikawari*). Thus knockouts in these games are rare. This is perhaps natural: professional go players have the tenacity of sumo wrestlers, with low centers of gravity, difficult to topple, and avoid at all costs stepping outside the ring, spinning and grappling their way back to the center.

Despite this fact, various "killing game records" have been passed down since olden times. prominent among them the challenge match game between Honinbo Shusai Meijin

and Master Karigane Junichi presented fully annotated in the latter half of this book, where the life and death of a large group of stones hinged on the result of a ko fight.

Ever since I was a youngster it has been my own style of play to always seek the greatest activity for my stones, even at the expense of creating thin positions and thereby giving my opponent an object of attack. The result of the game would depend on the life or death of these stones, and it often happened that my stones would pull through (shinogi) to decide the win; often enough that I was given the nickname of "Shinogi Sakata". Since shinogi has been a principal theme in my games, it is natural that "killing" would occur less frequently than in other players' games. but there too I have my share of "killing" games to my credit.

Besides selecting representative examples from among those games for the reader's perusal, other games from the time of the go saint Dosaku are offered, as well as those from the time of the other go saint. Shusaku. Ten games have been selected in which the outcome has been decided at the point of life and death and it is hoped that the reader enjoys them.

Even though in the final analysis "killing" is the theme, each of those games differs as to the exact cause of defeat. At the same time, the "killing" method differs in each case.

From that standpoint, I hope that the reader will savor these points while examining the individual games.

1- Sakata v. Shinohara game

(June 1955; Sakata plays black)

Figure 1 (1-41) Shinohara Masami 8 dan, played white here and I black. For many years Shinohara was famous for his powerful game. Against my redoubtable elder colleague, I played black 41 with the intention of killing the white group in the upper right. Before this, the hugging turn of black 37 was the overture to the killing: without laying the groundwork like this, preparations would have been incomplete. Had that been the case, after black 41 white could play a, black b, white c, black d, white e, black f, white g, black h and with white i, avoid being shut in and blockaded. When black 37 is in place, black can follow the preceding sequence with a move at j, slapping a lid on. Even so, had white neglected to play 38, black would have taken the vital point of k, which would have been unbearable.




Figure 1 (1-41)

Figure 2 (42-82) White's group in the upper right died and then black aimed at the seven stones clustered with white 50. The intention was to attack this group and with a single stroke decide the outcome of the game.

But again, it was necessary to prepare the ground before embarking on that course of action. Black 73 and 75 comprise the first step and then black 77 through 81 form the second step. Had white defended at a with 76, the seven stones would have practically safe, but then black b, white 76 and black c, extending out thickly (nobikiri) would make black thick all over the board, leaving white with little hope to salvage the game. The leaning tactic (motare) of black 77 and the rest is one of the most common "killing" techniques and is often employed. It would be devastating if white allowed black to block at 82, so white 80 and 82 are unavoidable. At this point, preparations are complete. Black can finally begin to attack white's seven stones in the center.




Figure 2 (42-82)

Figure 3 (83-85) Black's all-out attack begins with 83. If black responds to white 84 with a move at a, white will follow with a play at 85. making it highly unlikely that the group will die.

Therefore, in hindsight white should have previously, by devising some particular move order, contrived to play this move at 84 as a forcing move (kikashi).

One of the charms of go is that getting in a move like this or else failing to do so, can completely alter the situation on the board. Mr. Okame Sanjin has composed Ten New Commandments of Go, one which states: Force (kikashi) without regret, but preserve all the nuances. In this situation, white should have played at 84 before and left it at that without regret. Black 85 is the strongest attack and I read the variations through to the end before playing it. Although the enemy is allowed into the right side position, this was justified by my confidence in being able to annihilate the group.




Figure 3 (83-85)

Figure 4 (86-100) White 96 and black 97 are a matched pair (miai) of vital points.

Consequently, if white 96 is played at 97, black plays at 96, to be followed by white a, black b, white c, black d, white e, black f, white g, black h: and with i, in general white's group would manage to live, if only barely. But while allowing this, black next has the cut at j and white is left with a lost position.

In this variation, black must take care not to play h stubbornly at i in an attempt to attack white's eye space: after white h, black k, white l, black m, white n, and then black j, white o, black p, white plays q and the group in the corner that black worked so hard to kill enjoys a rebirth.

The upshot of both sides reading out these diverse variations was that white chose to try to escape below but...




Figure 4 (86-100)

Figure 5 (1-15: Black wins by resignation) Once the course is set for the "kill" and an all-out assault is mounted, halfway through one cannot get cold feet.

If black nonchalantly pushes out with 1 at a, white will play at 1 and there is a danger of an upset.

That is, the continuation is black b, white 5, black 4, white c: then black 8 and white 10 make the point of 12 and the one at 6 a matched pair (miai), leaving black in trouble.

Also, if instead of pushing out at b in this variation, black turns at 11, white 9, black d, white e, black 5, white 10, black 12, white f, black g and white b set up a race to capture (semeai), a failure for black. Black 7 and 9 are designed to unconditionally separate white's groups.

With this the aim of killing white's group is realized, securing 100 points of territory on the right side and deciding the win.




Figure 5 (101-115)

Now, following this, two representative games from the earliest stage of go history have been selected from the praxis of the go saint Dosaku.

The following does not strictly relate to the theme of this book, but I would like to write a bit concerning Dosaku.

In my opinion, within the history of go there have been two principal revolutions. The first revolution originated with this man, the fourth hereditary Honinbo, Dosaku Meijin. Dosaku was born in 1645, during the suzerainty of the third Tokugawa Shogun, Iemitsu, and died during the rule of the fifth generation Shogun, Tsunayoshi, in 1702 at the age of 58. In his early thirties he became Meijin-godokoro and facing the masters of the other traditional go houses, that is: Yasui Santetsu, Chitetsu, Shunchi. Inoue Inseki, Hayashi Monnyu, etc., he was practically unbeatable, though those opponents played with the fixed advantage of the first move. It was said that, "Dosaku's power at go is equivalent to 11 dan."

As opposed to the disparate methods of play prevalent up to then, Dosaku developed a rational approach which established the foundation of logic for today's go world. In short, he devised the parsing analysis used today for breaking down the component parts of a sequence of moves (tewari analysis) and for this Dosaku is truly deserving of the honor he is accorded as a go saint.

If the reader is next wondering what the second revolution in go was, it occurred in 1933, when Messrs. Kitani and Go Seigen developed and began playing the New Fuseki.

When the New Fuseki was publicized, amateur players everywhere began playing on the star points, on the fourth line, on the fifth line, initiating battles in the center of the board; it was a glorious revelation. The current popularity of high pincer moves is attributable to the spirit of this movement.

2- Dosaku v. Doteki game

(1682; Doteki takes two stones)

Figure 1 (1-36) Against Dosaku the other houses of go were forced to take black and still there were none who could win easily, but among Dosaku's students, there were five who were said to possess excellent skills, hardly inferior to the master himself. At the time they were called the "Five Tigers". First was Ogawa Doteki, second, Kuwahara Dosetsu, third, Sayama Sakugen, fourth, Hoshiai Hasseki, and fifth, Kumagai Honseki. Among these, the player in this game, Doteki, was the most accomplished of all the five students. At the time this game was played, it is recorded that he was thirteen years old and had already advanced to the rank of 6 dan. He is considered the most gifted prodigy in the history of the game. At the age of fifteen he became heir to the House of Honinbo and the next year began playing Castle Games, rising to the level of 7 dan and receiving at the same time the title of "jozu", and awarded a ten-fold monetary allotment from the government.




Figure 1 (1-36)

Figure 2 (37-50) Dosaku watched the progress of his student carefully, and one day determined to play him on even terms as a test.

Each played one game as black. And they both ended up winning with black by one point. These are the facts of Doteki's career, but regrettably he ended up dying young at the age of 21.

It has come down to us that Dosaku was disconsolate over having the apple of his eye snatched away from him, and he had no luck with any of his other students. Sakugen also departed before the master at the age of 25. Hasseki at 24 years. Honseki at 23 years.

The one remaining member of the group, Dosetsu, left the House of Honinbo to assume the position of heir to Inoue Inseki, so another youngster, Dochi, was invested with the hopes for the future.

Seeing just this game record, one acutely feels the loss of Doteki's early death.




Figure 2 (37-50)

Figure 3 (51-62) This game was played more than three hundred years before the present. Comparing the play of the stones of this era with that of the present age, one will naturally notice the absolute precision used in deploying stones these days, and yet, even at this early date, three hundred years ago, the groundwork of the present day sensibility was already being laid, with modern joseki just being invented. One marvels at the insight of that age. When analyzing the historical progress of go thinking, one first notes the tinge of logic displayed by the founder of the House of Inoue, Meijin Nakamura Doseki, who, comparing the corner, side and center qualities, recognized clearly the supremacy of the corner. Dosaku appeared on the scene about 50 years later, and at the same time as he promulgated parsing analysis (tewari), he pioneered the use of a three space pincer in conjunction with a 3-4 point stone, as opposed to one and two space pincers. This was in relationship to a whole board strategy.




Figure 3 (51-62)

Figure 4 (63-86) Focusing on this two stone game, black plays here in a tightly contained manner, surprising for a 13 year old, and one does not wonder that Doteki was fawned upon as a fabulous prodigy.

Dosaku attempted to engineer play against black's corner and kept his sights set on that. but in response black 62 in the last figure was a dispassionate capture (ponnuki) which eliminated many of white's possibilities; and then attaching at the vital point of black 72 in this figure was a calm and wonderful move that frustrated white's ambitions.

In response to white 73, black 74 was cleverly timed. and then with 76 and the following, an all-out assault is mounted against white's group.

However, Dosaku had one last trick up his sleeve to play as white.

For that purpose. white played 81 through 85 aiming to play the ko in the next figure.




Figure 4 (63-86)

Figure 5 (87-92: Black wins by resignation) White's last resort was the throw-in of 89, setting up a big ko. No doubt white would prefer, if possible, to first play at 89. to be followed by black 90, white 87, black 88 and then to take the ko at 89. If black loses the ko and then connects his stones, the race to capture (semeai) on the right side is just like that lost for black. Therefore, black, in response to this ko, can under no condition make a connection, and thus, in the previous figure Doteki filled the liberties with 76 and 78. Because of this, white had no choice but to start the ko with the first move at 87. This is a do or die ko that will decide the game, so black captured white's stones with 92. White now cannot hope to recoup his losses by pushing through at a, so he resigned in good grace. Next one of Dosaku's masterpieces will be presented, but before that, Dosaku's invention of move order analysis (tewari) will be examined further. Defining the technical term, move order analysis, it may be stated: "An investigative method of analyzing the context of the order of moves in order to determine the maximum efficiency of all moves played." Or else it may perhaps be stated: "




Figure 5 (87-92)

An analysis of shapes from the standpoint of game theory." Based on this way of thinking, Dosaku strived to force his opponent, whenever possible, into an over-concentration of power, into an over-developed shape. Diagram 1 dates from 1670 (when Dosaku was 25 years old), with Yasui Chitetsu 7 dan playing black. This was a masterly demonstration of good play: after this, black played at a, white b, black c and white d, and it is obvious that black's shape both on the upper side and in the center has been made to look foolish. The game in Diagram 2 was played in 1682 (when Dosaku was 38 years old) at the Satsuma clan residence with the Okinawan player Peichin Hamahika taking four stones.





Diagram 1

This game was won by white by 14 points, but most interesting here was the strategy white used against black's large knight move corner enclosures with 5 and 7.



3- Dosaku v. Dosa game

(1683; Dosa plays black/fixed color)

Figure 1 (1-13) The move order of the first 70 moves in this game has been omitted with only the position presented. Therefore black 1 in the figure is actually black 71. Black moves out in good form with 1 and 3, aiming to attack white's group on the upper side. After white lives with the moves up to 12, black next switches the attack to white's group in the upper left. Using the impetus of this fighting, black plans to attack the white group in the lower left which still does not have clearly established eye shape. One is instructed to, "Divide and conquer (karami)," and this game shows perfect actual playing conditions where this takes place. In the next figure that splitting attack reaches its climax, and the game is replete with thrills as one watches to see how the go saint Dosaku weathers the crisis.




Figure 1 (1-13)

Figure 2 (14-27) With black 27 in this figure, white's groups above and below come under a model splitting attack (karami).

Black next plans to atari at a: white plays b, and with black c, the white group is sealed in; otherwise, the other prong to the attack is the diagonal move at d.

It may be expected that Dosaku thought for a long time here, but unfortunately the time spent on the moves was not recorded.

Eventually, Dosaku played at 28 in the next figure, and concerning this it was noted: "The variations that bore upon the ko in the corner were read out completely, leading white to play elsewhere (tenuki) with 98 (white 28 in the figure), a miraculous feat."

Before looking at the next page to see the result, the reader is urged to analyze the situation.




Figure 2 (14-27)

Figure 3 (28-29) The player Dosa who is featured here was the younger brother of Dosaku. The family name was Yamazaki and his given name at birth was Chimatsu.

As with Dosaku, his allegiance was to the House of Honinbo, but in 1673, when the second generation Inoue Inseki died at the age of 69, he bowed to the demand of Honinbo Doetsu and assumed the mantle of leadership of the House of Inoue.

Thus he became the third generation Inoue Inseki and established the precedent that the leader of the House of Inoue would be called Inseki through succeeding generations. After his retirement he was known as Kyusan.

The successor to Dosa Inseki was a disciple of Dosaku named Kuwahara Dosetsu, who, when Doteki had been named as successor to the House of Honinbo, had moved to the House of Inoue. Dosetsu is known to us as Meijin Inseki.




Figure 3 (28-29)

Figure 4 (29-78) In the previous figure white reinforced the center, saying, in effect. "Do your worst to the white group in the lower left!"

So starting an attack here with black 29 is natural. In this way the lower left corner becomes ko with white 50. but in such situations, before plunging into a ko fight, one should carefully read out completely the number of ko threats at the disposal of each side.

In the case of amateurs, after a ko develops, the large majority will then look over the whole board and count up the ko threats available to themselves and to the opponent.

However, if before that a player is able to count the ko threats, that player may perhaps be considered to be of professional level.

In this position, both sides vie with their ko threats, but when white plays at 78 in the right center, black has no suitable ko threats left.




Figure 4 (29-78)

Figure 5 (79-102) White wins by resignation) Black 79 fills a liberty and ends the ko fight; this is perhaps unavoidable. The ko is worth close to 70 points, and there is no other point of that size.

Therefore white pushes through with 80, and up to 84 swallows black's group whole in the upper right.

The upshot is that white reaps close to 50 points, an acceptable balance of accounts. In addition, as a result of this black's group in the center becomes thin, necessitating the reinforcement at 85; and white also ends up taking the initiative in the lower right corner.

It is clear that black is lost here.

From the first figure to here, through all the vicissitudes there was no time to even catch one's breath, and without doubt Dosaku's thorough reading will be judged "miraculous" by posterity.




Figure 5 (79-102)

4- Jowa v. Genan game

(May 1816; Inseki plays black)

Figure 1 (1-23) I suppose that all lovers of go are familiar with the rivalry between Honinbo Jowa Meijin and Genan Inoue Inseki quasi-Meijin.

No two others in go history lived such dramatic lives. Undoubtedly they were rivals of destiny, and they left a large number of games they played together. The game that is examined specially here ended in only 59 moves. It is completely unheard of between players of this class for resignation to be forced within this short number of moves. Obviously Jowa Meijin was in poor condition. It has been passed down to us that after the game Inseki warned his students that, "The night before a game, never keep late hours."




Figure 1 (1-23)

Jowa was a man of many talents, for instance, he cultivated an interest in folk verses. and like Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, he loved sporting amusements. The following is a popular senryu of the day —

"Leave the rug as it is, says Jowa"

Invariably when a game was finished, he would put the board away and, leaving the rug as it was, would start in on different game with one of his friends among the servants. No doubt he was engaged in similar pursuits when he kept late hours before games of go.

Before examining this game, I would like to offer some additional thoughts concerning these two players. They were stars of the highest order in the go world during the waning days of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Jowa was born in 1787, Genan in 1798, which made Jowa 11 years older. The first time they met over the board was in 1813, when Jowa was 26 years old and Genan 15. Up until 1829 they played 69 games. Starting with a black/2 stone handicap. Genan played next taking black regularly and finally black/black/white. The result, as detailed in the collection of Jowa's complete games, was that Jowa won 28 games, lost 34, with 3 draws (jigo) and 4 unfinished games. Among these games, playing black, Jowa won 6 and lost 1. Both died natural deaths, Jowa at 61 and Genan at 62, but whereas Jowa realized his life's ambition by becoming Meijin-godokoro, Genan never achieved the honor. Jowa attained the position of Meijin-godokoro in 1831 when he was 45 years old, and in the "Zain Danso" (a historical study of go in the Edo era published in 1904) he is described in the following way.

"Short and stout, with bushy eyebrows and full cheeks, Jowa's composure is unshakable and the fiery glint in his eyes seems to ward off aggressors. When he finally reached his life's ambition (becoming Godokoro), the happiness of his students and all others in his household knew no bounds, and riding this crest, they established a new lyceum (dojo) at Kurumasakashita at the foot of Mount Uenotoei at dawn on the next morning. Five meeting days were set on the fourth, tenth, sixteenth, twentieth and twenty-sixth of each month, when visitors and regulars were feted at tables laden with food, and the youngest students were helped up to them. Such plenty had never been seen before."

An immensely talented youngster, who would become the go saint Shusaku, was raised and trained at this Honinbo dojo at Kurumasakashita, and when he became shodan at the age of 10 in 1839, Jowa stated with unbounded delight, "With this the art of our House is established for 150 years. From now on the fortunes of our school will soar." When he speaks of 150 years, it is perhaps best to interpret the starting point as beginning with Dosaku.

However, if we continue discussing the players of the Edo Era (1603-1868), we will lose sight of our main topic. Although we would like to give a complete account of the interaction between Jowa and Genan, it is better to pick a good point to begin a full-blown analysis of this game.

Genan studied as a disciple of Hattori Inshuku who dubbed him "Oni" (translated "Devil" but meaning "uncannily powerful") and began his career under the name Intetsu. Later he changed it to Rittetsu. In 1821 he was requested to become the successor to the House of moue and again changed his name, this time to moue Ansetsu. He assumed leadership in 1825, and after he retired was known as Genan. His Buddhist name in death was Kis-sai. At the time this game was played he was still known as Rittetsu.

Finally, since the historical successors to the House of Inoue were invariably called Inseki, we have come to differentiate them as the first generation Inseki, Meijin Inseki, Genan Inseki (the 11th generation), Setsuzan Inseki, Kinshiro Inseki, etc.

Figure 2 (24-26) Black's aim here is to slide into the upper left. Since white's group would then be painfully squeezed between black positions, Jowa added the move at 24. In response to this, Genan's black 25 is one move that performs three functions, as the following shows. First, it bolsters black's group in the upper left. Second, it attacks white's four stones on the left side. Third, it works in conjunction with the upper right to sketch the outline of a large territorial framework (moyo). White plays 26 because if things are left as they are an attachment by black at a, one way or another, gives rise to uneasy feelings. While reinforcing here, the hope is that next black b, white c and black d will provide white with the impetus to play at e, and at one stroke both positions above and below are strengthened. Up to this point, the moves have been made as if by iron fists in velvet gloves, but how is a crisis precipitated?




Figure 3 (27-29) Jowa penned two volumes of his collected works. "National Artistry Sight-seeing" and "Meditations on an Assemblage of Go Boards". while Genan passed on educational tracts such as "Exquisite Heirlooms of Go" and "Records of Thorough Go Analysis". The foundation of present day go was set up during this age. Continuing from the last figure, black puts up resistance with 27 and 29, disdaining to go along with white's wishes as analyzed before. and aiming next at: white a, black b, white c, black d, white e, black f, white g, black h, white i. With this sequence black prevents white's cut in sente, and then can go ahead and play at black j, building ideal shape on the upper side.

It is obvious that at this level of expertise both sides are reluctant to accede to the opponent's wishes. Contrarily, the reverse course is indicated. to haul the other side along with one's own pace.




Figure 3 (27-29)

Figure 4 (30-41) It is recorded that this game was played at a Genbikai meeting. This was held under the auspices of the head of the House of Hayashi who was the author of "Gokyo Shumyo" (a distinguished collection of go problems) and "Ran-ka-do Kiwa", the renowned Hayashi Genbi, quasiMeijin, who resuscitated the fortunes of this House. Probably the intention was to bring a convocation of famous players to the scene, but suddenly a group died, leaving everyone gasping in surprise. In response to white 30, black 31 is natural. Now an attachment at 32 by black would be intolerable and if white cuts with 34, black butts up against white to the right of 32: then it would be impossible for white to get out into the center. which would not be good. Black finally begins to attack with 35. When play reaches 41, as before, white is in difficulties. If white plays at a here, black b. white c, and then black d: e and f next are a matched pair of points (miai). This is terrible for white.




Figure 4 (30-41)

Figure 5 (42-59: Black wins by resignation) In response to white 58, black butts up against white's position with 59, finally forcing Jowa to resign. For Jowa, who was overwhelmingly powerful and precise, and unparalleled in competitive fighting spirit, this was truly an unusual breakdown. Within this sequence, white could cut at a. However, in that case, black would cut at 52, capturing two important stones; this would reduce white's two stones (at 42, etc.) to meaninglessness. A simple sense of pride would prevent one from playing this way, so white battened down the hatches with 52 and died an honorable death. Professionals, more so than amateurs, are prone to cling to the innate value of their stones' purposes. Sometimes one will play a simple probing move to see how the opponent will respond, and unexpectedly a full-blown melee will break out; it is the stubbornness of professionals that leads to this.




Figure 5 (42-59)

The next figure to appear here is the go saint, Shusaku. Along with the go saint, Dosaku, there is no player who has left as great a mark on the history of go. Even now practically everyone knows and uses the 1, 3, 5 Shusaku style opening, and if only today there were no komi given, move 7, the diagonal move that forms a part of his "black to play and win fuseki" would still be used. Another famous matter was his record in Castle Games over a thirteen year period: he played 19 games and won them all.

Another famous episode occurred when he was asked how a game went. Without speaking of winning or losing, he replied: "I played black." But in the present day go world, the system is set up so that black gives a large $5\frac{1}{2}$ point komi, so it is not really possible to use this kind of reply.

Since we are on the subject of komi, I would like to add here that I feel that a $4\frac{1}{2}$ point komi is favorable for the black side. Compared to Jowa Meijin's style, which we characterized above as being overwhelmingly powerful, Shusaku favored a solid approach, building and storing power in his game. At one time I earnestly played over the moves of the games of venerable bygone masters like these, and while doing so I became palpably aware of the intense passion they felt for go. It is unlikely that I would be familiar with the facial features of these people, but somehow, in a flash, I repeatedly had hallucinations in which I found myself sitting next to the very image of these men as they hunched over a go board. Another thing: it does not jibe with his reputation as a go saint, but it seems that Shusaku would lapse into periods of long thought rather often, and even this player had spates of misreading. There is an interesting episode connected with Shusaku. This happened at the end of October 1852 when Shusaku was 23 years old and his master, Shuwa was 32. He played black and the game was halted midway through only to resume half a year later, in March of the next year.




Diagram 3

At that time, the variation in Diagram 3 was played, but black had the opportunity to push through at 7: this ended up as the move at 1 in Diagram 4. There are two ways of playing here: black can push through and press at 7 and 9 or simply press at 7 and 9, omitting the push through. Fixing the shape with black 1 to 5 in Diagram 3 means that since the push through is omitted, white is prevented from cutting at 13 and going for an exchange (furikawari). The variation in Diagram 3 up to white 14 is conditional upon black not pushing through before.




Diagram 4

The upshot is that in Diagram 4. black a next, with white b leaves black with gote to play at c. But if the black 1, white 2 exchange is not made. black c is sente. As he was playing Shusaku realized the recklessness of the move order played, but the damage was done and there was no going back, and a close game (3 point win) was the result. Is this not an anecdote filled with humorous aspects?

5- Shusaku v. Matsujiro game

(October 1845; Shusaku plays black/fixed color)

Figure 1 (1-7) At the time this game was played, Shusaku was 16 years old. Matsujiro was born Ito Matsujiro and hailed from Nagoya. At the time of this game he was 6 dan. Afterwards, he received the honor of having his name changed by Meijin Jowa. to Showa, and from the year of 1849 he joined Shusaku in first playing Castle Games. From his first appearance in Edo (Tokyo). Matsujiro garnered an audience of second tier players looking for instruction and was invited to the tables of nobles: a social flower. He advanced to the status of quasi-Meijin and died in 1878 at the age of 78. While he was in Nagoya, frequently travelers on a sojourn would call at the dojo where he studied, and this game was played during a visit by Shusaku. In the work, "Reverberations of Precious Tapping Stones" (the collection of Shusaku's games), it is recorded that during the same month they played four games, with Shusaku playing black and winning three, losing one.




Figure 1 (1-7)

Figure 2 (8-30) During this era the "Taisha" joseki was often played. Concerning the "Taisha". Master Nozawa Chikucho wrote the three volume work. "The Theory of the Taisha" and according to that. when faced with the cut at white 14 in this figure. would invariably extend to black 15, never once using the method of play which starts with the cut at 18. Originally, the "Taisha" evolved from the low pincer of 1 in Diagram 5, and the player who first played it was Aihara Kaseki (a disciple of Meijin Inseki). In 1732 he played the moves in Diagram 6 as white against Honinbo Shuhaku.




Diagram 5




Diagram 6




Figure 2 (8-30)

Of course, ladder considerations were irrelevant here. Sometime before this the fifth generation Honinbo Dochi played white 1 in Diagram 7 against Master Takahashi Yuseki playing black. Perhaps this should be regarded as the very first example of the "Taisha".




Diagram 7

Figure 3 (31-49) Two years after this game Shusaku traveled to Osaka for the first time and played his first game as black against Genan Inseki. In the lower right corner, play developed as in Diagram 8, with Shusaku answering at 11, falling into a trap. After this, white played a, black b, white c, black d & white e.




Diagram 8




Figure 3 (31-49)

Figure 4 (50-66) However, after that Shusaku played exquisitely and in the midst of the middlegame played an astounding move with multiple purposes.

It is well-known that upon seeing that move Genan's ears turned red. In those days Shusaku was eighteen years old and 4 dan.

At first the 8 dan Genan played Shusaku giving a two stone handicap. But they suspended the game and the next day switched to even play.

After the "Ear-reddening Move Game", Genan played three games against Shusaku, who played black, and besides one game that was suspended, Shusaku won all the rest.

The figure here is the game played two years previously, and examining it one can see clearly the solid yet sharp Shusaku style at work.




Figure 4 (50-66)

Figure 5 (67-81: Black wins by resignation) With the cut at black 67 and 69, we finally see the patented Shusaku attack. It is easy to imagine that he had already read out the result. Black 81 is a model example of a tesuji that decides a game at a single stroke, and it completely slaughters white's five stones. Playing 81 at any other point would not lead to such a good result. It is said that in a symmetrical position one should play in the center: this illustrates the matter perfectly. Furthermore, after this the eight white stones in the center become dead weight. It is natural that Showa resigned here. In this game we devoted much space to the discussion of the "Taisha", somewhat to the detriment of the game analysis, but it is hoped that the reader will appreciate the young Shusaku's masterful kill.




Figure 5 (67-81)

The next game features this same go saint, Shusaku, here paired against Ota Yuzo 7 dan. The end of the Edo era, around 1830-45, was a fabulous "Golden Epoch" for go, and it was very popular for the heads of leading trading companies at the time to invite the top Houses to go convocations. In the 1830's there were four celebrated players: Ota Yuzo, Ito Showa (detailed before), Yasui Sanchi (the ninth generation, son of Chitoku Senchi), and Sakaguchi Sentoku. But Yuzo headed the list.

Shusaku and Yuzo were well-matched opponents and keen rivals, so one might conclude that they were the same age, but in reality there was a twenty-two year difference between the two. The first time they played each other was in 1842, at which time Ota Yuzo was 35 years old and 6 dan while Shusaku was 13 years old and 2 dan: play was set at two handicap stones. Over an 11 year period, up to 1853, they played 16 games at two stones and seventy even, fixed color games, with Shusaku winning 46, losing 27, with 6 jigo and 7 games where play was suspended. As might be expected, Shusaku was sorely troubled by Yuzo, and it was quite a while before he managed to succeed in firmly establishing play at even game, alternating colors.

In 1853 a thirty game match began between Shusaku and Yuzo, playing even game, alternating colors. Yuzo was 47 years old, Shusaku 25, and both were 7 dan. From January to November, 23 games were played and by the 17th game Yuzo had been beaten down to taking black two out of three games. Worse yet, the net record was in Shusaku's favor, with three wins, one loss and one jigo. Shusaku played black in the 23rd game, but Yuzo brilliantly parried to make the game a jigo. It is called Yuzo's masterpiece of a lifetime. Things were left at that, with the 24th game unplayed and three years later, in 1856, Yuzo died during a trip to the Niigata area of Japan. It is recorded that Yuzo was a good-looking man with a pale face and red lips, bushy eyebrows and cold and limpid eyes, and jet black, bushy hair. He was born in Edo (modern day Tokyo) and was a fine dancer as well as a man-about-town. He was loathe to crop his hair in the manner of an apprentice monk, so even after he rose to 7 dan he did not appear in Castle games.

6- Shusaku v. Yuzo game

(March 1853; Shusaku plays black)

Figure 1 (1-35) It is recorded that "black's coordination of moves throughout the board was exquisite". When Shusaku played black he would normally adopt his standard 1, 3, 5 opening discussed above, but Yuzo disliked this and played white 2 immediately at the 3-4 point in the lower right corner, avoiding the Shusaku style opening. White allowed black to make corner enclosures in the upper right and upper left corners, but Yuzo must have had confidence in this scheme, because he played exactly the same way, up to black 7 in their game played in February. In that game, white played 8 on the right side star point at a, but the game ended with Shusaku winning by resignation. Whether or not this is good with the modern komi, it is common sense that at that time allowing double corner enclosures was unfavorable for white.

34:

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


Figure 1 (1-35)

Figure 2 (36-59) Shusaku was a dutiful son and from time to time he would send records of games he played to his father in his home town.

He would append annotations and according to the analysis related to this game, "Black 41 is a propitious move. White plays 42 whence black 43, 45 and 47, discarding the stone originally played at 5, making 42 perforce bad shape. Later, upon the move of 91, white must needs submit with 92, and this is entirely to the good for black."

Professional players ordinarily pay close attention to the life and death status of disparate groups of stones, so even if one goes for a straightforward, direct attack, it will prove fruitless. More effective is to use the situation where a couple of weak groups exist, to develop a twopronged attack, and this game may be said to be a model example. With the attachment of black 59, white's groups to the left and right are disconnected.




Figure 2 (36-59)

Figure 3 (60-81) There are three points of interest to be seen during the course of this figure.

The first is white 74, which aims, when the opportunity appears sometime, to hane between black's stones at a, and provisionally cut by way of ko. Should white succeed in cutting here, the threatened stones to the left and right would, at a single stroke, have all their difficulties solved. However, it is not feasible to proceed immediately with this course, nor does black have time to remedy the defect here. The second is that with black 73 and 75 the two-pronged attack has developed to full scale. Even if white's group in the upper left is settled, the group in the center of the upper side and the group in the upper right have no eyes. The climax of this game will come from the resolution of this crisis. The third is the poke at black 81: white would be misguided to connect at b. That is because white c is a forcing move which black must answer at d.




Figure 3 (60-81)

Figure 4 (82-100) "In this game white would fain play ko with 95, but black guessed that intention, and upon the cut of white 94, settled the issue with 95," stated Master Shusaku.

The thing to which one must pay the utmost attention when setting to kill the adversary's stones is the order of moves. A move which, when played in advance is a forcing move, when played later is not necessarily so.

In such a situation, as expected, the go saint Shusaku did not waver in the slightest, but proceeded with all due care.

In this figure, the exchange of 91 for white 92, as well as the reinforcement of black 95, as well as, after that, before connecting in response to the poke of white 98 on the lower side, exchanging 99 for 100 in the upper right, etc., display an ironclad attacking stance.




Figure 4 (82-100)

Figure 5 (101-123; Black wins by resignation) With 23, black has scored a knockout win. At this point white is forced to sacrifice either the group to the left or the right. It is inevitable that a large difference in territory will result no matter which group dies. Afterwards, "killer of go" techniques will be discussed, such as leaning tactics (motare) as well as this kind of two-pronged attack, in close-up as powerful methods, and at that time it is hoped that the reader will remember the magnificent cut-and-thrust style displayed in this game by Master Shusaku for reference sake. Master Shusaku died of cholera in 1862 at the young age of 34, a fact that is truly regrettable. Suppose that Master Shusaku had the opportunity to play black according to the present 5½ pt. komi system; what kind of opening was he possible of coming up with?




Figure 5 (101-123)

Here ends the model "killing records" left by the old masters, and we enter the present age. And when speaking of the present age, towering above all to establish a grand epoch in the history of go, are the two masters Kitani Minoru and Go Seigen. Comparing the games of both these players to the ones of those paragons of the Edo Era (1603-1868), Genjo and Chitoku, they may also be considered Herculean pillars of the age, in no way inferior to the others.

Go first came to Japan in 1928 at the age of thirteen. Since that time, he discovered a number of new moves and has contributed more to the world of go than perhaps any other player. His conceptions were second to none, the sharpness of his play without peer; a generation of players without exception, studied and strived with Go as the target.

As for Kitani, in his boyhood he was dubbed the "Prodigy". He participated in the "New Fuseki" revolution and during his career changed his playing style five times. His play may be characterized as "reinforced with steel". His was an intensely forged art, and would exhibit a mixture of stability and great power. After first taking tight control of sure territory, he would then, in the inimitable Kitani style, force his way into the opponent's territorial framework (moyo) and demonstrate unrivaled power in ushering matters in his favor. And if that wasn't enough, perhaps Kitani's greatest contribution to the go world was the large number of outstanding disciples who emerged in a steady stream from his lyceum (dojo).

These two players have over the years played 60 games against each other and when there are, at present, a large number of professional players, this is a rare record. The game that follows was the sixth of their ten game match (jubango), when Kitani was at risk of getting beaten down a rank. Each side started with 13 hours on the clock and the game was conducted over three days. The playing site was the Enkakuji Temple in Kamakura. Since this ten game match was principally played in Kamakura, it is known as the Kamakura jubango.

7- Kitani v. Go game

(October 1940; Go plays black)

Figure 1 (1-14) The critical point of this game came after white invaded the upper right and hinged upon the life or death of this group, so the move order preceding this has not been shown. What it came down to was that black had set the pace from the beginning, with white striving to keep up. Then white sought to find play in the upper right corner with 2 and 4 and staked the game on the outcome of this challenge.

When white hanged into the center with 14, black was faced here with an immediate and important choice between two courses of action. In other words, should black play to force white to live in the corner? Or else, set to killing the whole group? If the reader was confronted with this position in a real game, in the end which course would be deemed best?




Figure 1 (1-14)

Figure 2 (Hypothetical variation) In actuality, Go did not play the variation in this figure. He played to completely destroy white with the severe attack in the next figure.

However, after the game Go reflected that:

"It is dangerous to try to kill the group. Without going as far as that, playing black 1 and 3 in this figure, forcing white to live in the corner with a, black b and white c would produce a sufficient result when black plays at d."

"Killing" requires precise reading. A great player of Go's stature will spend the time to read out the position before making a decision, but even so, there is the fear that a single misstep will cause an upset, so trying to capture stones requires the utmost caution.




Figure 2 (Hypothetical variation)

Figure 3 (Only 1) Go played as in the figure to take white's eyes. After this, how should white play?'

In the real game, 38 moves were played. The reader is urged to investigate whatever variations may be hidden here before verifying the result on the next page.

In general, Go's style of play fostered the reputation of settling matters in his games early, and when he discerned a winning advantage, it was normal for him to quickly wrap up matters and head for the endgame.

Consequently, winding up matters safely as in the last figure was probably best. To adopt the severe killing strategy here however, was perhaps due to the fighting spirit that welled up in the midst of the game. Even though it was a bit complicated, if there are stones to be killed, one wants to kill them, and from that perspective, it bodes well to settle the issue at a single blow.




Figure 3 (1 only)

Figure 4 (1-20) White 1 and black 2 are inevitable. In answer to white 3 next, black 4 is the death blow indicated by reading through the variations.

After white 5, 6 puts black's shape in order and eliminates white's viable options.

The first Honinbo, Sansa Meijin composed the following verse on his death bed

"If this were go, I'd start a ko fight and surely live, but on the road to death there's no move left at all" - indicating that in go, the emergency measure of playing ko means that a large group of stones will not die easily.

"A single weak group will not die" is a go proverb in the same vein. However, after black 20 in this figure, white has no eyes in this direction. There remains a potential (aji) for ko on the upper side but...




Figure 4 (1-20)

Figure 5 (1-18: Black wins by resignation) After the forcing move (kikashi) of the poke at white 1, 3 and 5 are played aiming to cut with ko in mind. But black answers precisely up to 18, resulting in white's complete destruction.

On a side note, during this Kamakura jubango a young shodan woman game recorder was startled by the violent play and unexpectedly overturned a bottle of red ink. There was a rumor that the provocation was the "killing move" in Figure 3, but I double checked this and found that the incident occurred, not in this game, but in the next one, the seventh, when Kitani played a severe three-step hane as black, and it is indeed true that at that time the surprise caused a bottle on a desk to be knocked over.

However, it would not have been strange if black's violent move had been the one that had actually upset the ink bottle.

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


Figure 5 (1-18)

8- Sakata v. Kitani game

(March 1957; Sakata plays black)

Figure 1 (1-13) The reader is next invited to examine my game with Kitani. The focus of this figure is on the life and death status of white's group on the right side of the center. Such being the case, the order of the previous moves has been omitted. First I played 1 through 11 on the lower side, which lays the groundwork for the "kill". In the "Gengen Gokyo" (a Chinese collection of disparate go material, including 376 life and death problems, dating from 1347) it is written: "If forsooth battle to the east is deemed desirable, first attack in the west"; in other words, the leaning tactic (motare) is used to block white's escape route beforehand, a necessary preliminary to an all-out attack. As the proverb states, haste makes waste, and when one is going for the "kill", special attention must be paid to this. The attack begins with 13.

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


Figure 1 (1-13)

Figure 2 (14-31) In answer to white 14, black 15 follows the line I read out. White cannot play at a in response. If he does so, black will press once at 26 and then can hane between white's stones at 30. Getting cut here would be unbearable.

White begins operations on the right side with 16 to 20, but in answer black plays the moves through 23, a variation that was also read out and 23 is the only move here.

If black is hasty here and uses 23 to seal the center with a, white 24, black 25, white b, black 23, white c, black d, white e, black f, white g, black h and white i captures black's two stones, enabling white to live easily.

At length the focus of the problem shifts to the center, but white 28, which as before guards against the black hane at 30, cannot be omitted.




Figure 2 (14-31)

Figure 3 (32-33) White flees with 32. If white chooses to play 32 as the common sense hanging connection in Diagram 9, black will attack with the moves following 2. Should this happen, a consummate twopronged attack entangling the white group on the left side results, so white seeks complications by means of 32. In response, black 33 is the vital point of the attack. The plan is to provoke white a and then poke at b.




Diagram 9




Figure 3 (32-33)

Figure 4 (34-54) White 34 is unavoidable. If white uses 34 to play the diagonal move at 44. black 2 in Diagram 10. striking at once across the knight's move. Also, white 1 at a will be met by the attachment at black 2. With this white must abandon hope of making two eyes, and so allows the black cut of 47. cutting in turn with white 54, which sets up a race to capture (semeai) with black's group on the lower side. This is his last resort. How should black resolve the situation?




Diagram 10




Figure 4 (34-54)

Figure 5 (55-61: Black wins by resignation) Races to capture are such that one never knows what might happen. But if black can live unconditionally here, that ends the matter. period.

That is, black 55 forces the moves to white 58, and up to 61 black lives.

After this white is left without a move. So here white resigned, but if white had played at a, black b and white c, black lives easily with d. In this way the game ended in a knockout, but tracking the matter back to Figure 1, I trust that it is clear to the reader that prior to embarking on an all-out assault, one must read out a number of variations to their conclusion.

As in chess a misplayed attack results in what is called "exhaustion of resources", in go "over-developed shape" (amari-gat-achi, i.e. an excess of moves performing no function) is the most frightening result.




Figure 5 (55-61)

Kitani's powerful play and the depth of his reading were startling. Thus in Kitani's case, when it was usual to counter the opponent's formation of a large territorial framework (moyo) by invading with an erasure move, he would calmly play elsewhere, fortifying territorial profit and ceding the opponent another move to do the same to the moyo. He would often play games with this strategy, jumping in afterward and finding weaknesses to exploit to go rummaging around. It was a first rate battle plan.

After showing two games of my esteemed elder colleague's in which large groups of his stones were captured, to redress the balance one of Kitani's "killing" games from his days as the "Prodigy" will be offered next: a game with Master Karigane Junichi.

This was a game from the knock out match between the two leading schools of go of the day, and later in Part III the "Great Battling Game of the Showa Era" pitting Shusai Honinbo v. Master Karigane Junichi will be thoroughly analyzed. Following that game the rivalry between the Nihon Kiin and the Kiseisha erupted full-scale in the pages of the sponsoring Yomiuri Newspaper. In the midst of this, Kitani Prodigy 4 dan took the stage; the game here is one of his signal victories. In any event, the Kiseisha was made up of only three players: Karigane Junichi, Onoda Chiyotaro and Takabe Dohei, and this match was arranged with the Nihon Kiin and its galaxy of stars. The Kiin dispatched its bright young players to face these veterans, and when they racked up a superb score playing even (black in all games), the world was astounded.

And Kitani Prodigy distinguished himself in this company with the following fantastic record of straight wins. As even (black in all games): Takabe—win, Karigane—win, Onoda—win, Takabe—win; with two stones: Karigane—win; as even (black in all games): Onoda—jigo, Onoda—jigo, Onoda—win; and finally in the tenth game, playing even (black) against Karigane, he lost and was knocked out of the match. The two stone game against Karigane follows for the reader's perusal.

9- Kitani v. Karigane game

(1928; Kitani takes two stones)

Figure 1 (1-32) The Nihon Kiin, a non-profit foundation, was established in 1924, fusing all of the elements of the go world together. But three months after its establishment, five players: Karigane, Takabe, Onoda, Suzuki Tamejiro and Kato Shin left to form the Kiseisha.

At the time, Kitani was 15 years old and had just become shodan. As a disciple of Suzuki, it seems that he was put into an awkward position, but right away both Suzuki and Kato returned to their place at the Kiin and he was relieved.

The Kiin/Kiseisha match began with the heads of both groups facing off (Shusai v. Karigane), and afterward, the Kiin side, flush with fighting spirit, ended with 26 wins to 14 losses.

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


Figure 1 (1-32)

Figure 2 (33-56) At the time, running the gauntlet of the three veteran colleagues of the Kiseisha and scoring wins in the knock out format against all three, even if one was playing black every game, was evidence of the young Kitani 4 dan's energy and looming power.

In the last figure and this one, Kitani played in a relaxed and ambitious manner and on a large scale, regardless of the fact that he began the game with a two stone handicap.

Regarding Karigane's go style: "It illustrates the problem with reading moves too deeply," criticized his master, Shuei Meijin. But when stones collided in contention, grappled and wrapped around each other, he displayed unparalleled power.

He left the Kiseisha in 1941 and established the Keiinsha, and at the age of 60 played a jubango with Go Seigen, as all go aficionados know.




Figure 2 (33-56)

Figure 3 (57-78) A go proverb teaches us that a ponnuki is worth 30 points. In this figure white sacrifices the right side, but the power gained by the ponnuki capture of 75 is immense.

Master Karigane often used this kind of sacrifice tactic. In this game he misplayed the throw-away technique and was neatly taken by Kitani. But there is a lesson here that amateur players must learn: if one carried away by the thought of capturing stones, in exchange one's own stones may get wrapped up in sente, with the opponent building a large territorial framework.

If black uses 74 to connect at 75, the game cannot be won. Black is motivated by fighting spirit to play 74, and after this, both sides are compelled by circumstances into the following unforked variation.

Well then, for the next move, what is the best way for white to play?




Figure 3 (57-78)

Figure 4 (79-84: Black wins by resignation) White 79 is the quintessential Master Karigane move. It fills a liberty in the race to capture (semeai), as well as being a vital point.

The intention behind white 79 is to provoke black 82 and then hane with white 84. At that point, if black plays a, white answers at b, and although black will win the race to capture with c, white will seal off the center in sente. This is distasteful.

Black 80 is the only possible move to frustrate white's aim. Because of this, white has no way of stopping black from advancing to the left without leaving defects in white's shape (aji). If white defends at d in response to black 84, the encroachment will be stopped, but that is as far as it goes: white is saddled with gote and black will next seize the initiative to occupy the good point at e, settling the issue. At black 84 white resigned.





Figure 4 (79-84)

Reference Figure (Up to move black 78) Analyzing after the fact, it seems that white 79 would rather have been better played as the hane at 1 in this figure. If black answers this by playing a, white's two-step hane at b is good; if the one space jump of black c instead of a, white attaches at d. Furthermore, if black plays one point lower, at e, this time white plays the jumping attachment at c. Whichever course is taken, this way of playing is superior to that of the game.

In that case white gets the initiative to take the allimportant strategic point in the lower left, expanding the territorial framework (moyo) with white f, black g and white h.

When "killing" stones, one must pay careful attention to the way of capturing, or of being captured, as illustrated in this figure.



Reference Figure

In amateur games "killing" situations appear very frequently. In comparison, they do not occur nearly so often in professional games. That is because in the case of professionals, stones that seem as if they may die are abandoned while the loss is small and the damage will not prove fatal. However, as the reader has seen in the individual games shown previously, even in the case of professionals, strategic conditions may dictate that the outcome of a game rides on the life or death of a large group of stones. In short, "killing" situations arise from one of the two cases described below.

The first is when one perceives that prospects are dim. Then, even if a large group of stones is without two clearly established eyes, and a further move is necessary, a player defiantly stakes the game on the life or death of that group. This may be interpreted as a situation where the player is looking for a place to resign, or else it falls under the rubric of an "honorable death".

The second one is when, transgressing the bounds of the rule of go that a sole weak group never dies, a player sprints ahead taking territory rapidly while leaving stones within the opponent's territorial framework (moyo). This tactic dares the opponent to kill one's stones, risking the game on one's ability to pull those stones through (shinogi). This is dangerous for the player who instigates the tactic. but it is also unnerving for the other side, for if the attack misfires one will not have enough territory to win.

The last game in this part is a model example of this strategy. An interesting fact here is that the one playing against this strategy is Ohira Shuzo 9 dan. Among professionals, Ohira 9 dan and Fujisawa Hosai 9 dan are feared as players who consciously set out to capture stones. That fact creates maximum interest in seeing how the strategy works out, but as might be expected with Ohira, the stones ended up being skillfully slaughtered. This game is on the next page.

10- Ohira v. X game

(June 1967; X plays black)

Figure 1 (1-13) The name of Mr. X has been deliberately kept secret. He has been playing go for sometime at a neighborhood club. Facing Ohira 9 dan who is renowned for killing groups of stones, Mr. X tried the drastic "weathering the storm" (shinogi) game plan.

To start off, 3 through 7 in the lower right take the maximum amount of profit. Because of this, black's large group of stones from the upper side into the center becomes strikingly thin, but taking no heed, black makes a further incursion into the upper left corner at 13. Of course, it is true that black could have secured the large group of stones in the center with 13. But perhaps he felt that the burden of the komi was too great.




Figure 1 (1-13)

Figure 2 (14-26) Black took more profit in the upper left corner. Following black 25, white could of course take the corner with the double atari at a. but upon further reflection, a comparison with the previous figure will show how deeply white's territory has been encroached upon. However, because of this black's large group in the center becomes even thinner.

Above all, provoking the reinforcement of white 16 on the upper side is terrible. With this, various weaknesses, that could have been exploited to gain profit while indirectly threatening white's upper right corner, disappear. Now the focus is on the problematical center. With white 26 the all-out assault on the center finally begins. Ohira 9 dan is acknowledged as the peerless "killer" among all players in the Nihon Kiin. How deeply did he read before beginning the all-out assault? What variation was Mr. X counting on to tide him over (shinogi)?




Figure 2 (14-26)

Figure 3 (27-53) Black's territory on the right side down to the lower right corner equals 50 points. From here on, the outcome of the game will hinge upon black's managing to secure life (shinogi) for the central group.

Black's plan was to attach at 27.

White had also figured this into his calculations. 27 to 38 is an unforked road. After exchanging 39 through 42 in the upper right, black seeks to escape with 43.

When play reaches white 52, the two moves (4 and 6) that white played in the lower right in Figure 1 are found to provide valuable assistance at this time.

We are instructed to block all escape routes when setting out to capture stones, and here is striking proof of the matter. Cutting in the center with black 53 is the only move. Events proceed in the next figure.

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


Figure 3 (27-53)

Figure 4 (54-73) If an amateur beginner were playing, these black stones would probably avoid destruction.

For those readers who doubt this, the question is posed: in answer to the last move of this figure, black 73, how should white respond? Please determine this before turning the page. Actually, at this point white has a clear advantage, but still, one likes to wrap things up cleanly.

Also, concerning the course of events up to 73, there is much to learn from white's solid play.

Black 65 and 67 separate white's groups to the left and right, and 71 and 73 are black's final attempt at resistance. Will the reader's coup de grace be the same as Ohira 9 dan's? Before turning the page, please read out the next three moves.




Figure 4 (54-73)

Figure 5 (74-76: White wins by resignation) White 74 and 76 beautifully administer the coup de grace to black's large group of stones.

It is understandable that even Ohira's friends fear this God-father of "killers".

Up to here we have examined ten games illustrative of various kinds and styles of "killing", but capturing stones always entails pluses and minuses. Unless one keeps these pluses and minuses firmly in mind, one should not by any means attempt to capture an opponent's stones.

In the next part the reader is given the opportunity to study these pluses and minuses and is urged to master them in order to display the muscle of a first-rate "killer".




Figure 5 (74-76)

II — "Killing Stones": Pluses and Minuses

(1) Do not Try to Swipe the Honey.....	80
(2) Do not Celebrate too Early.....	91
(3) Beware of "Muscle-bound" Shape.....	93
11- Sakata v. Miyashita game.....	95
12- Go v. Hashimoto (Utarō) game.....	102
13- Sakata v. Fujisawa (Hosai) game.....	108

In Part I the reader was introduced to the excitement of killing stones.

Among the charms of go there is nothing as thrilling and delightful as this. Regarding the matter, what techniques must be used to actually go ahead and kill the opponent's stones? Those actual techniques will be thoroughly discussed in Part IV, but prior to that, in this segment the pluses and minuses that are involved in "killing stones"... or rather, mainly the minuses will be discussed. Without building a detailed groundwork of understanding about these minuses, one cannot successfully embark on "killing". The first thing one must understand is...

(1) Do Not Try to Swipe the Honey

"Swiping the honey" is a term that professional players often use when relating their thoughts to each other after a game. It refers to over-concentrated shape (korigatachi) that occurs when one feasts too heartily, when one's stomach swells and one finds moving difficult.

More than anything in go one must pay close attention to the activity of the stones. All stones are created equal but the potential activity of each stone is something that professional players take pains over even in their dreams, in order to wield it in the most effective manner. However, at times the shape of one's stones becomes overconcentrated; in spite of having played more stones in an area than the opponent, one's position is not dominant to an equivalent extent. A 50/50 result or even a disadvantage may result.

This is caused somewhere by playing useless moves or moves that duplicate effort or moves of trifling import.

Professional players continually strive to insure that the power of their stones does not overlap, i.e., that over-concentration of shape (korigatachi) is avoided. For example, if one is faced with having to deal with the power of a wall, the thing one must consider immediately is the proper distance to maintain in relation to that wall.

In the opening, when pondering how to make an extension or a pincer, professionals will make super-human ef-

forts to squeeze 100% of the value out of their stones. At the same time, they will try to force their opponents' stones into over-concentration (kori-gatachi) as far as possible. And then, sacrifice stone strategy is utilized from the opening through the middlegame.

The first stage in developing the mind set of a "killer" is to understand how to avoid getting caught up in one of these sacrifice stone schemes.

If one has the attitude that every catchable stone must be captured, one will get snagged by sacrifice stones and before one realizes it, one's own shape is frozen into overconcentration. This may be shown in a concrete example: the trick move (hamete) in Diagram 11 is often employed against beginners. When black plays 1, white answers with 2.




Diagram 11

In response to black 1, white has two choices: push through and cut or else block at the top. Blocking will lead to a result that can be envisioned as the natural one in Diagram 12. This is common sense. The antithesis of this common sense is white 2 in Diagram 11, which dares the opponent to capture the one stone in the corner. The off-beat move here is based on the essence of trick move principles.




Diagram 12

Continuing on the next page, black 3 in Diagram 13 gets caught up in the momentum of capturing white's stone, and then

the moves follow an unforked variation. Diagram 13 quickly proceeds to Diagram 14.

Actually, black could avoid falling into the opponent's trap by using 7 to safeguard his position with a move at a. Next 7 and b are equivalent options (mini). However, preceding heedlessly to capture is a selfdelusion: one gets sucked into a whirlpool. Diagram 14 leads directly to the sequence in the following diagram.

Up to 7 in Diagram 15, black achieves the original goal of annihilating white's five stones, but considering the result from the standpoint of tewari analysis (which was introduced on page 24) we must scrutinize Diagram 16. (White started with a stone here and added five more. These have been removed. Six extraneous stones of black's have been removed. tewari)

There is no question that Diagram 16 shows black hobbled by over-concentration (korigatachi).

This is an extreme example of swiping the honey! But it is not uncommon. A few other snares follow...




Diagram 13




Diagram 14

15 connects




Diagram 15




Diagram 16




Diagram 17

"Swiping the honey" appears often in handicap settings. White 1, etc., in Diagram 17 encourages a flubby black. That is because if white followed the sequence of white 3, black a, white 1, common sense would dictate that black play b. After Diagram 17, Diagrams 18 and 19 proceed apace in an order of moves which offer little room for variation.




Diagram 18





Diagram 19

In Diagram 20, black answers white's move at I by setting out to capture white's four stones with 2. This is just what white has been waiting for: a chance to wrap black's stones up. 3 through 11 follow, and the result can be analyzed in Diagram 21.






Diagram 22




Diagram 23




Diagram 24

The most well known example of honey swiping is Diagram 22. Every student of handicap go has at one time or another been warned about this move. It is hard to find a better example of the utilization of sacrifice stones.

White 1 is the first of the sacrifice stones, and trying to capture with black 3 in Diagram 23 is dangerous. When white cuts with 10 in Diagram 24, things get complicated. Next Black 3 in Diagram 25 is the worst of the worst.




Diagram 25




Diagram 26

Black could offer stronger resistance by playing this move as a hanging connection at 13, but at the very least, it is better to play 3 at 9. (Ultimately, in the race to capture [semeai], black 3 fills no liberty, meaning that a move has been played fruitlessly.)

Diagram 26 clarifies the result of Diagram 25. Black has played one more move here.

A classic example of a trick move.

Joseki is usually supposed to end up in a 50/50 result, but sometimes one fails to profit despite being able to kill some opponent's stones during such a sequence.




Diagram 27




Diagram 28

Diagram 27 shows the beginning of this situation. Black 9 is usually played at a. Next, if capturing white's stone in a ladder at b is impossible, common sense suggests that black 5 be played at 6.

Momentum builds with black 9 and 11, and events proceed as in Diagram 28. Black goes all out to capture white's five stones.




Diagram 29




Diagram 30

Next Diagram 29. If black played 21 in the previous diagram at 1 in this diagram, white would engineer a reversal with a fencingin move at 13. Black would lose the race to capture by one move, suffering complete destruction. In this diagram white's five stones are captured, but up to 19, white builds a considerably thick wall.

Considering this shape from the standpoint of the tewari analysis in Diagram 30, black cannot feel proud of the result.

Furthermore, black has played an extra move here. Naturally, such play fails to impress.

In even game joseki settings, momentarily surrendering to the urge to swipe honey can land one in a terrible trap.

The sequence up through white 8 in Diagram 31 is often played in games between equal opponents. Black 9 is one possibility that can be considered, though playing at a would be safest. In answer to 9, white cuts at 10 and the follow-up is complicated.

Continuing with Diagram 32: going after white's five stones with black 7 is not a good policy, either. White's intention from the start was to sacrifice the five stones, and that strategy really hits stride with 10 and 12, wrapping black up.

After this diagram, white forces (kikashi) with 1 in Diagram 33 and again with the hane of white 3. Black is forced to answer at 4, and the result after white 9 shows black's territory to be awfully small.

Diagram 34 is a tewari analysis of Diagram 33. The extent to which black has swiped the honey here is obvious. Another thing: I would like to explain the theory of this kind of tewari analysis in greater detail, but an entire separate book would be needed for that.

One more example.

The shape in Diagram 35 on the next page often appears in the variations proceeding from 5-3 point joseki.




Diagram 31




Diagram 32

17 connects




Diagram 33




Diagram 34

Connecting in a line with black 2 and 4 anticipate white extending into the center with 5, and aim at attaching at 6, a strong arm tactic played to capture white's three stones below. (Played when black does not fear a ko, since white gets a multitude of threats in this area.) Proceeding as in Diagram 36, white ends up one move short and the stones die. It appears that black has scored a success here but...




Diagram 35

White seals black in with 1 and 3 in Diagram 37, building a thick wall in sente. There is no comparison between the power of this wall and the territory black was given in the lower right.




Diagram 36

As usual, tewari analysis is given in Diagram 38, which shows that black's territory is only ten odd points.




Diagram 37

In addition, it is striking how many moves have been played to no purpose here. It is clear that one must avoid capturing stones clumsily.

We professional players take great pains to find the most effective way to utilize our stones, to find the best way to sacrifice our stones, and consequently to find the best way to avoid swiping honey. Up to here we have examined localized situations




Diagram 38

involving honey swiping, but now the reader is offered a good full-board example.

Diagram 39 shows a game played at the end of 1955 between Messrs. Go Seigen and Murashima Yoshinori. However, these same players had, thirteen years previously in the Oteai, played exactly the same moves up to white 20. Analyzing a little bit here; black 9 aims at having white crawl on the lower side at a and then playing a pincer at b. White disliked that prospect and so pushed through and cut. White usually draws back to c with 20, but in that case letting black move out with d was distasteful.

This had been the first public game between the two in thirteen years, though it is doubtful that they played privately during that time either. In the previous game, white had skillfully sacrificed stones in the lower right, establishing an advantage. This time Murashima came up with a new countermeasure, and its success is the focus of this game.




Diagram 39

Thirteen years previously, black had played 1 and 3 in Diagram 40 on the next page and white had responded by discarding five stones in the lower right corner with 4 and 6, developing outward influence. Black has no way of pushing through to the outside.




Diagram 40

If white's five sacrifice stones wind up being disposed of as in Diagram 41, then tewari analysis leads to the shape given in Diagram 42. The spacing of white's stones all over the board is also good, so this result is a considerable success.

With this kind of background, Murashima daringly played the same first 20 moves, though not without preparing an antidote. What kind of move could he have come up with? Before turning the page, the reader is urged to ponder the matter.




Diagram 41




Diagram 42

Murashima had prepared black 1 in Diagram 43. The point is that if the moves white a, black b and white c are exchanged, now white cannot seal black in with d and e. The upshot was that white answered at 1 in Diagram




Diagram 43

44, leading to an unexpected variation. Black sacrificed four stones of his own through 16, and was fully satisfied with the position that resulted, in coordination with the stones in the upper right. If white 15 is omitted, black is left with a move at a, turning the corner into seki.

At this stage the reader has graduated from the "Do not Try to Swipe the Honey" segment and may proceed to the next lesson in the strategy of a killer,




Diagram 44

(2) Do not Celebrate too Early

The ideal result for the "killer" is boxing's knockout; the murderously powerful punch, the collapse of the opponent, the ten count, and one's hand held up high in victory.

However, sometimes the count does not reach ten, the opponent gets right back up, down but not out, and naturally the game continues. In boxing it might happen once, twice that the opponent is knocked down, but stages a counterattack, and it is not rare for the blows to wear one down and suddenly the tables are turned and one loses.

Go, after all, has many aspects of a marathon to it, and a slight stumble is not fatal. It happens quite often that one nicely captures a group of the opponent's only to waver afterward and suffer an upset loss.

That is because one dwells excessively on the fact that *stones could be killed*, even though there are many games where such a course of events does not lead to great advantage.

Putting this into concrete terms, even if the group of stones captured is large, if a race to capture (semeai) results, liberties must be filled and the stones must be taken off the board, leaving an unexpectedly small profit.

Also, in the case where the race to capture comes down to a one move difference, should a large ko develop elsewhere, the race can be used very effectively for ko threats.

Accordingly, in the games of amateur beginners, the opponent's stones may be killed, but afterward a reversal is suffered. This is a frequent occurrence.

The first writer of the Yomiuri newspaper's go column, Inoue Takuji and the sixth, Yamada Torakichi were involved in episodes that make good illustrations.

The late Inoue Takuji was a genial soul but he liked to capture stones. However, when Inoue captured his opponent's stones in the opening, he would be pleased as punch, and would visibly slacken in his efforts, playing one weak move after another, and invariably lose.

This lead one of his go partners at the time to declare, "Lose eight, nine stones to him at the start and everything will turn out well."

The sixth writer for the paper, Yamada Torakichi, played strongly against strong opponents and slackly against weak ones, exhibiting a wide range of strength. But when he has stones captured, he is famous for the Herculean strength he suddenly displays. One day he was playing go with an old rival when he had a large group of stones killed through a mistake. Realizing what happened, Yamada played a sharp invasion into the opponent's territory, precipitating a difficult battle. While rampaging about, in a flash the dead stones found a breath of life and a large group of the opponent's stones ended up dying instead.

With a look of disgust on his face, the rival glanced at the board, slowly sat up straight and in a hoarse voice said angrily —

"You played dirty. When you lost those stones, why didn't you resign?"

These anecdotes from the two writers show that a "killer" must be careful after accruing an advantage in the opening. One must not celebrate too early.

When one captures stones, one necessarily incurs a liability that lingers. (If a big ko begins elsewhere, retribution is swift and sharp.)

Consequently, one must not celebrate too early; and if possible, when one kills stones, one should time it so that the killing is done when, by so doing, the result of the game is decided.

Among us professional players as well, there are examples of great advantage gained in the opening causing vacillation and ultimately an upset loss. If one pats oneself on the back, or is lulled in the thought that one has done well enough, slack moves are induced. When this happens repeatedly, even a position with considerable advantage can be thrown into doubt. The timing of a "kill" and the avoidance of inflated valuations of profit gained in a fight are important. Additionally, in cases where a capture has resulted in potential problems in one's position (aji), one must be especially circumspect, and play solidly afterward.

Finally, the third point is,

(3) Beware of "Muscle-bound" Shape

There is nothing to be feared more than muscle-bound or overwrought shape (amari-gatachi).

A "killer" must have a healthy respect and exercise vigilance concerning muscle-bound shape. Amari is a technical term, generic to the game of go, equivalent to exhaustion of resources in chess. It describes the shape that results when an attack is misplayed or runs out of steam. To quote Mr. Hayashi Yutaka's Encyclopedia of Go: "Amari-gatachi Ungainly shape that results from obstinate pursuit of an attack which the opponent dodges flexibly, leaving the attack stymied. For instance, following the 5-4 point joseki that starts with an inside attachment as in Diagram a, white 3 in Diagram b is unreasonable.




Diagram a




Diagram b

This is a trick move (hamete): if black cuts at 9 with 8, white can play at a. However, cutting at black 8 is calm and collected and the moves up to black 10 are natural. At first sight, white's shape looks robust, but the cutting points at b and c are disagreeable. What is more, white has played one extra move here, an inefficient result as well. This kind of situation is called amari-gatachi. This is correct. Mr. Hayashi has used a good example to define over-developed shape. We professional players, whenever attacking, pay close attention to insure that our shape does not become over-developed, and on the contrary, adopt measures to foist this shape on the opponent. This high level technique is known as amashi strategy. With this in mind, a "killer" must very carefully read out the variations before attacking in order to by all means avoid over-developed shape.

One must refrain from both swiping honey and celebrating too early, but over-developed shape can lead directly to one's destruction. So, in the same way as sumo wrestlers strive not to lose their footing or step out of the ring, keep on your guard.

An actual example is a game I played against Miyashita, where I set out to kill some stones only to have a painfully diabolical move cause me to fall behind. The reader is invited to review this over-development game next. When attacking, the most frightening prospect is to have the opponent brilliantly surmount a crisis (shinogi) by means of an exquisite move hidden up the sleeve.

11- Sakata v. Miyashita game

(June 1955; Miyashita plays black)

Figure 1 (1-3) Miyashita's nickname was the "Wild Bull of Fukushima". In this game the wild bull went on a powerful rampage.

The problem was in the upper left corner.

I played white 1 and my adversary, black 2. Then, with white 3 I went to kill black's nine stones. If these stones wind up being captured, that is the end of the story.

This game has previously been published in other volumes of mine such as, "Sakata's Go", "Sakata Eio Game Collection" and "Diabolical Moves, Exquisite Moves", etc., with the failure to kill and the consequent overwrought (amari) shape getting close-up attention.

How would the reader play to secure life for the black group?




Figure 1 (1-3)

Figure 2
(Black's
diabolical
move at 1)
 Black 1 was
 the unex-
 pected,
 diabolical
 move. Since
 this move
 works, I had
 to play white
 1 as in
 Diagram 45.
 Then the
 moves




Diagram 45

through white 13 follow. In the corner, black a through k
 proceed in alphabetical order leading to ko.

White has adequate resources to fight this ko.





Figure 2 (Black's diabolical move at 1)

Hypothetical Diagram 1 (1-11) Black plays 1 with three aims.

First: set up a race to capture (semeai) with white's corner group. Second: connect to the right. Third: set up a race to capture with white's group below. To start with, what will happen in the race to capture with white's group below? This hypothetical diagram addresses that question. White 2 through 6 combine defense of the corner stones with an attack on black by filling liberties. Pushing through and cutting with black 7 and 9 is natural. However, after black 11, white a, black b, the ko that develops is a little complicated, but white ends up annihilated. Well then, if black cannot exit below, what if white plays 2 at c? (If black 7 and 9, this time white forces at 10 and then plays at 1 l.) Now black has an exquisite move: the descent (sagari) at 6. That is shown in the hypothetical diagram on the next page.

4:
throw-
in two
points
below
3;
5:
cap-
tures



Hypothetical Diagram 1 (1-11)

Hypothetical Diagram 2 (1-19) The Black descent (sagari) of 1 is an exquisite move with three ends in mind. If white plays 1 in Diagram 46 to prevent black from escaping to the right, black will play 2 and the rest, making black a, connecting underneath to the group below and b, living, equally viable options (miai); and on the contrary, white's seven stones are killed. In order to avoid this, and to defend the corner while filling in one of black's liberties, white plays as in Hypothetical Diagram 2. However, connecting underneath with black 3 is skillful technique, and after black 17, white must defend in the corner. But black 19 makes white's moves seem pointless. Well, what if white simply defends with 2 in the hypothetical diagram at 18?





Diagram 46



Hypothetical Diagram 2 (1-19)

Figure 3 (1-8; subsequent moves omitted. Black wins by 3 pts.) If white 1 in

Diagram 47, black pushes through and cuts with 2 and 4. The atari of 7 is inevitable, so black gets to cut with 10 and 12 and kills white's six stones here with 18. Nevertheless, if white simply plays 7 at 9, black plays 8 and

white's stones below are insufficiently supported. In the end, there is no other option but to play the diagonal move of white 1 in Figure 3. Then black ? is again a skillful move and slicing through with black 4 and 6 reveals white's killing strategy as a complete failure. It was one game in which the attack misfired.




Diagram 47




Figure 3 (1-8)

Among the pluses and minuses of "killing stones", one must pay strictest attention to over-developed shape (amari-gatachi). That is because over-developed shape always incurs a disadvantage, generally leading to a losing position. A simple illustrative diagram will demonstrate this. With black's stones disposed as in Diagram 48, questions pending are: should one try to kill these stones or not? If chased into the center, will black be able to make a second eye or not?




Diagram 48

Sealing black in with white 1 in Diagram 49 makes things clear. In that case black is forced to live with 2.




Diagram 49

However, attacking with white 1 in Diagram 50 is a "killing" strategy which, by taking away the opponent's eyes, chases black into the center. But if the attack should fail and black makes an eye in the center, white has played one move at 1 and sustained a one point loss, a disturbing possibility. This possibility of an over-developed shape resulting is so troubling to professional players that they rarely go for a kill in earnest. Of course, there are no qualms when a group can definitely be killed. Wholesale slaughter is supremely satisfying.




Diagram 50

The essence is in reading power, in knowing which stones can be killed. But miscalculations occur when one analyzes with wishful thinking.

- In the preceding pages the danger of recklessly going for a "kill" was discussed in conjunction with three hazards that accompany stone-killing strategy. However, one must also be cognizant of the other side of the coin: the value of "killing".

Particularly in situations when killing cleanly will decide the result of a game, one must seriously consider the "kill".

In Spaghetti Westerns, the hero will invariably wind up in the clutches of the bad guys and come in for a drubbing. It is as regular as clockwork, or as joseki. Sometimes he is only beaten severely, sometimes his hand is stabbed with a knife, or he is hung by his heels, or he is buried up to his neck. But his enemies never, ever administer the finishing blow. (Of course, if the hero dies, the movie would be in trouble, but,,) Because of this, the hero escapes by the skin of his teeth, and reappears for the final showdown. No doubt the bad guys would swear that they should have killed him when they had the chance.

Winning in go demands a similarly cold-blooded approach. If stones can be killed, they must be thoroughly exterminated.

If that happens, a difficult, soul-numbing endgame is unnecessary. In baseball, if you do not score during your chance at bat, the opponent will score in the other half of the inning. There are many examples of this in the games of professional players. Here we will examine two such instances for the reader.

Earlier the reader was warned in the strongest terms about the three evils of swiping honey, celebrating too early and enduring over-developed shape, but now the lesson is: ***do not miss your chance***. Two illustrations are offered to demonstrate this diametrically opposed conclusion.

12- Go v. Hashimoto (Utarō) game

(September 1946; Hashimoto plays black)

Figure 1 (1-15) This was the second game of a ten game match (jubango) held immediately after the war. In the first game, Hashimoto, playing white, had won by 5 points. (Jubango were played without komi.) This next game also went well for black. However, black misplayed an attack on white's group on the lower side, and, while killing the group would have given a favorable result, having it live brought about a one point loss. After that, a physical breakdown contributed to four straight losses. This historical position became a watershed in the match.

Cutting at 2 in the lower left was black's compensation for losing the ko in the upper left corner, and although white lived in the corner with 5 and 7, white's six other stones nearby were left isolated and abandoned. The focus is on how black can best attack these six white stones.




Figure 1 (1-15)

Figure 2 (1) Hashimoto Utaro played the diagonal move of black 1 here, but this was dubious.

Because of this, white was able to skillfully secure life (shinogi) for the six stones.

What order of moves must white play here to do so?

What is the result here?

Before turning the page, the reader is asked to consider this question. Please also try to determine what black should have played instead of this diagonal move.

In go, the difference of even a single move can lead to huge changes. That is why professional players make a special effort to ensure that blunders (poka) are avoided. Failing to do so is like plowing the field and forgetting the seed.





Figure 2 (1)

Hypothetical Diagram 1 (1) Here black should have attacked with the knight's move at 1 in the hypothetical diagram.

We can speculate about the psychological factors that affected Hashimoto. Black had lost the upper left corner in the ko fight and in exchange separated white's groups in the lower left.

Being cut here, one of the remaining halves would be hard-pressed to scramble for life, while the other half would have to be sacrificed.

However, black was not giving komi in this game, so the judgment must have been made that even conceding life to the other group would not have thrown away the advantage; white's life would be small and black would get thickness in return. And in truth, this board position seems to support the idea. But that case would have the game decided in the endgame, leaving plenty of room for complications.



Hypothetical Diagram 1 (1)

Figure 3 (1-14) With white 1 to 13, Go played a skillful sequence of moves to make two eyes in this small area.

Both here and in the lower left corner white has managed to live, so the game is still be decided.

The plan behind black 14 is to convert black's powerful walls into territory. Later black made several unfortunate mistakes in the endgame before succumbing to a 1 point defeat.

Players in the Edo era were not bothered by time controls, could think deeply about the endgame and thus, like Master Shusaku, could boast of sure-fire wins playing black. In the present age, time constraints lead to hurried moves (byo-yomi), and model play is impossible. Incidentally, each side started with seven hours for this game, which meant that the game was finished in one day.





Figure 3 (1-14)

Hypothetical Diagram 2 (1-2) Games in the modern age are played under these time limits, (even among amateur players, title games in tournaments are played with time controls, usually an hour and a half for each player), so if possible, killing a large group of the opponent's stones and winning by resignation is best to avoid this kind of thing.

In this game, if black had played the knight's move instead of the diagonal move, white 1 would be answered by the extension of black 2, most likely denying white life. Continuing on the subject of time limits, in order to finish a game in one day, six hours apiece is ideal. Today, in important games, players are given ten hours each and the game is finished in two days. Before the war, thirteen hours each was usual with the game ending in three days. The trend is for faster and faster time controls, and in international contests, etc., it is probably best for games to be completed in one day.



Hypothetical Diagram 2 (1-2)

As a professional player, I myself can play well no matter what time constraints there are, whether ten hours or six hours or an even more shortened limit of three hours. One must accustom oneself to the conditions.

Interestingly, when I was at the height of my powers, at times, driven to the extremity of a minute per move, I would manage passably, but with the passing of the years, I get tired more easily, and so I must conserve my time to the end of the game. Among our fraternity of professional players, Takagawa Kaku 9 dan, utilizes his time in the most logical way.

The game just presented showed an example of a loss caused by the failure to administer a finishing blow, and the next offered to the reader is another model of irresolution, where the game was lost due to insufficient vigor in pressing for the advantage.

This conclusion is reached after the fact. When the time came to fight it out during the game, the opportunity was missed and there was no second chance afforded by the opponent. Amidst the thick of battle, matters were terribly complex.

But what the "killer" needs to understand is that, as in the previous game, one must not miss a good chance to land a mortal blow, and at the same time, if one sees an opportunity, one must without fail actively take advantage of it, not giving the opponent time to catch his breath.

For this purpose, it is natural that one cultivate the power in one's lethal punches along with the accuracy of one's reading. In other words, develop one's "killer" techniques, and in that sense there is an affinity to Part IV. Regularly studying the pluses and minuses of "killing" fosters one's ability to clearly judge the principles of go and the nature of a position. That is the beginning of true strength.

13- Sakata v. Fujisawa (Hosai) game

(July 1961; Sakata plays black)

Figure 1 (1-2) Probably no one is unfamiliar with the overwhelming power of Fujisawa Hosai. This player regularly makes deliberate efforts to kill large groups, and employs singularly difficult methods in his games, wielding a plethora of weapons.

In this game, the stones on the upper side had come under attack, but had in turn counterattacked. Black's stones were cut and in a turnabout, black's group in the upper left was targeted for destruction.

Black's options are limited. From the standpoint of the overall position, black must resist with the diagonal move of 1 in the center, but white plays 2 and foreboding clouds of a "kill" are starting to gather. Black must pour all his strength into pulling his group through (shinogi).




Figure 1 (1-2)

Figure 2 (3-21) There is no alternative to black 3, 5 and 7.

However, when white plays the mild move of 8, black's group is practically stabilized.

With 15, black is alive, one way or another. Later, as an emergency measure, white can precipitate a ko by force. That is, with: white a, black b, white c, black d, white e, black f, white g, black h, white i, black j, white k, black l; actually, afterward white did attack this way.

Anyway, after playing 15, black gets a breather. Now black's thickness in the center holds sway and the game is difficult for white. The reason this happened is the questionable white 8. This move should have been used to play more aggressively by pressing the attack against black.




Figure 2 (3-21)


Hypothetical Diagram 1 (1) As stated on the last page, white let slip the chance to vigorously go for the win, and ended up forfeiting any winning edge.

Therefore, instead of 8 in the previous figure, white should have played the diagonal move in the upper left with 1 in the hypothetical diagram, aiming to decide the game at once.

Playing this way, black's group would have no way to live.

Consequently, black would have no choice but to cut white and start a race to capture (semeai) with the group on the upper side. I was resigned to the likelihood of this and beset with trepidation over the difficulties in store.

Well, what will happen after this? Please consider this.




Hypothetical Diagram 1 (1)

Hypothetical Diagram 2 (1-10) Black 1 through white 6, to begin with, are unavoidable.

White 6 is good, expanding the volume of white's group and increasing the number of moves needed to capture it.

Black 7, white 8, black 9 and white 10 are also common sense moves, and in this resulting position, black loses the race to capture (semeai).

If black is lost here, other variations must be analyzed for black 7. The reason that we professional players spend hours at a time thinking about a single move is that we think: "If this move is played, what happens; if that move is played..." trying to read variation upon variation. If the real game had followed the course shown, it is likely that much time would have been exhausted here.




Hypothetical Diagram 2 (1-10)

Hypothetical Diagram 3 (1-3) In the hypothetical diagram on the last page, black was obviously lost in the race to capture, and so will cut with 1 and 3 in this hypothetical diagram.

White will connect at a or play the ko at b in response, and the fact is, either move will lead to unfathomable complications.

But white just let black's group to the left settle itself without problems, relinquishing winning chances. Instead, black should have attacked as ferociously as possible as in the hypothetical diagram.

The difficulty inherent in the interaction of stones and the knack involved in "killing" strategy is displayed impressively here and should be taken to heart.



Hypothetical Diagram 3 (1-3)

III — Immortal Games Fully Annotated

14- Go v. Sakata game.....	115
15- Shusai v. Karigane game.....	151

In this Part two games that have never been published in book form before are analyzed in detail.

The first game is one from the days of my youth, in which I played an even game against Go Seigen (at the time 6 dan and 25 years old) for the first time. Five years earlier, when I became professional shodan, I played a commemorative game with two stones against Go and won by 2 points.

Accordingly, the game that we will examine here was played after that time. At the end of this game large groups of stones were caught up in a fantastic capturing race (semeai), triggering a big ko fight. That climaxed in an orgy of killing during which I made a huge mistake, playing one move that lost one point. Eventually I lost by 1 point, but this is an unforgettable game for me.

From the opening onward, the game was intensely interesting, and as this detailed analysis unfolds, I hope that the reader joins in that spirit and pursues the inquiry as if playing the game alongside me.

At the end of each right-hand page, the reader should reflect inwardly: "What should be played here?" and investigate the possibilities. Please turn the page only after appraising the various factors in the position.

Therefore, when the reader is relaxed and has a fair amount of spare time, please read through this Part leisurely and savor the nuances. At busier times, going on to Part IV or Part V is appropriate.

Following this, the second game examined is the famous fighting masterpiece between Shusai Meijin and Master Karigane Junichi. This is the epitome of a harrowing "killing" game, and it excited widespread enthusiasm. Here it is scrutinized from a fresh vantage point, probing the momentous life and death factors affecting large groups of stones the two great masters battled over.

14- Go v. Sakata game

(April 1939; Sakata plays black/ fixed color)

Figure 1 (1-10) At the time of this game, I was a 19 year old 4 dan.

Fujisawa 5 dan, Takagawa 4 dan and Tanaka 4 dan were a trio who were much celebrated in the go magazines, and Sakata was said to be just a step behind.

Of course, Fujisawa was young Kuranosuke, now known as Hosai. Takagawa was Kaku. Tanaka Fujio regrettably died young. I was considered one step behind because, even though I held the same 4 dan rank as two of the others, at the time there were A Class 4 dans and B Class 4 dans. Go was far and away our superior and we were granted few opportunities to play with him. This was a "Game du Jour" sponsored by the Yomiuri newspaper. It was the second time I played him and the first time playing even.




Figure 1 (1-10)

Figure 2 (11-13) White 10 in the last figure was a new scheme.

If white plays the hackneyed extension to 12 with this move, black will build up his position with a, which white perhaps found disagreeable. But it goes without saying that the plan was to work in conjunction with the star point stone in the lower right to develop influence in this area.

Should black play elsewhere (tenuki) now, white will immediately attack at the vital point, so I defended at 11. Choosing to play 11 as, say, an attachment at b, followed by white c, black d, lets white then play 11, falling right into line with the opponent's wishes.

Even so, I was tempted to play elsewhere here, perhaps at e; but I wondered if the variation: white 11, black f, white g, black h, and white i wouldn't be complying with the pace of my adversary. So I chose the safe and solid diagonal move of 11.




Figure 2 (11-13)

Figure 3 (14-20) I invaded the lower right corner with 15, which may seem premature, but in this situation it is not clear

what the best way to play is, so my intention was to *settle the shape and then decide how to play*.

But on a more basic level, the approach to the corner with black 13 in the last figure should have been played from the other direction, at 20. Approaches to corners should be made in the area the opponent hopes to play (i.e., the direction that offers the most unstaked territory).

A 3-3 point invasion joseki results through white 20, and now black must determine the best way to live. That is, if black leaves the position as it is (tenuki), white kills by descending (sagari) at a. Then: black b, white c, black d, white e.

(Caution: If white, instead of playing a, hanes ate, black sets up a ko by playing b, white a, black c, white f, black g. Of course, readers of this book already know better than to make such a mistake.)




Figure 3 (14-20)

Figure 4 (21-29) Black 21 and the rest, complete the joseki. But perhaps the hanging connection of 29 should have been played as in Diagram 51, pressing once again upward, followed by the hanging connection of 3. In this diagram the cut at a is pending.




Diagram 51

However, if white uses 2 to cut immediately, Diagram 52 results, and black continues by playing at a or b.




Diagram 52

Please compare these variations with the figure.




Figure 4 (21-29)

Figure 5 (30-34) White 34 is a probe.

Depending upon how black answers this move, white will decide on how to play the next move.

How would the reader answer this move? There are three choices:

First, the connection at a.

Second, the connection at b.

Third, the block at c.

The connection of black b here will be followed by white's cut at a, black d, white c, black e, white f, black g, white h, and black's three stones are captured. (Or else, white will play c as a diagonal move at f.)

Incidentally, the time limit for this game was nine hours apiece with play conducted over two days. What is more, the game ended just before 12 o'clock midnight on the second day, with 331 moves played, quite a long game.




Figure 5 (30-34)

Figure 6 (35-37) Black blocked at 35. Had white not probed here, I planned Diagram 53, aiming at the attachment of a next. Black b is also an effective forcing move (kikashi).

Answering white 38 with black a, white b is worthless since the position is open at the bottom. Diagram 54 would end in sente.




Diagram 53




Diagram 54




Figure 6 (35-37)

Figure 7 (39-42) Play reaches a lull with white 42. Black expected Diagram 54 on the last page, but Go simply played 42. After this, at some time black a, white b will be played.

Well, what should be played next? There are four points to consider:

First, black a, white b and black c immediately. Second, black d, or else black e, playing to swallow up white's stone.

Third, black f, hitting white's stone on the left side at the shoulder, white g, black h, white i, black j, white k and black l, playing on a large scale. This is a little high-handed but...

Fourth, play in the upper right. If black were to play there, developing with a large knight's move, that is, black m could be considered.




Figure 7 (39-42)

Figure 8 (43-46) Black 43 is a wonderful big point.

It is so good because to a great extent it neutralizes the power of white's thickness in the lower right. Because of this, Go stated after the game

"Before black played at 43, for example, at white 36, white should probably attack at a. If black answers at b, then following the course in the figure would be good."

A one point high attack against a star point stone is severe, so usually it will be answered by a one point jump. This is seen in the upper left. Instead of the move at 45, black had the choice of playing at c in the lower left. But then white will make a pincer attack at 45, and from olden times this has been considered bad for black. I felt that black 45 was playable.




Figure 8 (43-46)

Figure 9 (47-50) Since white played at 46, adding the moves of black 47 and 49 was natural.

If black plays elsewhere here (tenuki), white will next attack with 49, black a, and white b. This is not good for black.

Here white attacked in the upper right with 50. In response, black has two logical countermeasures. First, a black pincer on the upper side at c.

In that case, white d, black e, white f, black g, white h and black i would lead to exactly the same variation that was played in the lower right corner.

Second, a black descent (sagari) to e, preventing an invasion at the 3-3 point.

Then the usual thing would be for white to make a two point extension to j.

Which way does the reader like?




Figure 9 (47-50)

Figure 10 (51-55) A writer observed during the game

"I'm dead, dying, about to die," says young Sakata, he of the close-cropped head, repeatedly. "It's like I'm taking nine stones, being forced (kikashi) all over, I'm dead," he laments again and again. But this is Sakata 4 dan's habit. His heart and his gestures are different things and the reader should not be deceived by appearances

When I was young, I would often mumble, "Now I've done it!" etc., and yet end up winning my games, so I was given the nickname "Whining Sakata". This is not a flattering characterization, and those who made it up should take it back. Other nicknames I was dubbed with include "Tiding over (shinogi)", "Razor-sharp" and "Blunted-edge". How many others have been subject to such a wide range of descriptions?!




Figure 10 (51-55)

Figure 11 (56-60) White 60, diving into the upper left corner is ever-so-much like one of Go's first class moves filled with potential (aji).

The reader is asked to please think about the next move.

Common sense dictates that there are three possibilities:

First, defending the 3-3 point with black a. Second, butting against white with black b. Third, separating white's stones with black c. Black a is the usual idea, but one way or another it seems like black has been forced into it (kikashi). If black b, white d can be expected in the future. Black c would be answered by white e, black f and white g...

However, no move other than one of these three can be considered here. If black d, white c leaves all sorts of potential problems (aji).




Figure 11 (56-60)

Figure 12 (61-66) It was scheduled that the first day's play would end with a move sealed at 5:30 PM, but the attachment of white 66 signalled the beginning of a difficult variation, and I spent more than an hour and a half sweating over my next move. At that time I mentioned to Go that it was an awkward juncture to seal a move and Go was kind enough to play until a lull was reached in the game. That did not occur until 8:30 PM, and white 96 was sealed.

For black 67, I considered butting against white at a, and descending (sagari) at b. This took some time. If, in response to the descent of black b, white pokes at c, black wedges in at d. At the time Go related that —

„I thought too much about white 66; black counterattacked fiercely. I should have played in the usual way with white c, black e and white f, getting out into the open.“




Figure 12 (61-66)

Figure 13 (67-78) "Sealing white 66 would have been best," said Go later.

Since white 66 was played, the life and death of both sides' stones becomes the focus of contention. One wishes to seal after this is resolved, or, for that matter, play it out to the death, in which case sealing is not a question. Regardless, white 78 was a skillful, inimitable move of Go's.

I imagine that the reader's first thought is to push between white's stones with the diagonal move of black a. But obviously white is waiting for this, and it will turn out unexpectedly badly. Please confirm this for yourself.

Also, please reflect upon the question: if separating is no good, how should black play here?




Figure 13 (67-78)

Figure 14 (79-90) If white had played 78 in the previous figure at 80 here, black 78 would be ideal, but white adroitly turned the tables and got to the move first.

Black 79 at 80 leads to Diagram 55. Now if black a, white plays b, and black is now in trouble. Also, if black 3 at 4 here, then Diagram 56.




Diagram 55




Diagram 56

Here too, white cuts with 4 and with forcing moves (kikashi) at a and b, black will not do well.




Figure 14 (79-90)

Figure 15 (91-95) In this board position white sealed 96, ending the play on the first day; we had a late dinner that night.

Before turning the page, what does the reader think white should play in this difficult position? There are three possibilities:

First, cutting to the left of 95. Second, extending to the right of 92. Third, capturing to the right of 93.

Anyway, the crux of the game is the mutual attack going on here.

At present, black would like to hane over white's stone on the right side, taking control of it. Or else, undermine white's three stones in the upper left with a perfect hane... These are moves that scream for attention, but the game has gotten too busy to pause for this.




Figure 15 (91-95)

Figure 16 (96-100) I would guess that many amateurs wonder which side actually benefits from the sealed move, the sealer or the one who waits to see the sealed move.

It seems that the majority of us professional players feel that the one sealing is at a disadvantage. That is because one tends to worry that the move sealed was not a good one and this disturbs one's sleep.

Leaving that aside, I am the type who has a lot of nervous energy and on the night of a postponed game can not sleep well. At the time of this game I finally dozed off towards morning, ended up oversleeping, and dashed off flustered to the playing site.

The second day began as a splendid Sunday morning. Go was already there.

While we each sipped our tea, we leisurely set to reopen hostilities.




Figure 16 (96-100)

Figure 17 (101-108) After the game, we both mentioned moves we regretted.

Go said, "The hane of 2 would have been better played as the descent (sagari) at a," while I said, "3 and 7 should have been held in reserve." From the further course of the game, these thoughts are shown to be reasonable.

Well, here is where the middlegame fighting will decide the game. Where should black play 9?

What one must do is make a careful survey of the whole board, evaluate both sides' positions and then decide on a move.

First to strike one's eye is the atari of black b in the center (to which white must respond by connecting) or else the violent cut of black c.

Second is the hane on top of white's stone at d.

Third is the defensive move in the upper left of black e. One other thing that must be considered is that if white plays b in the center, white f next is sente.




Figure 17 (101-108)

Figure 18 (109-116) I played the sharp and vigorous cut of black 9.

Perhaps playing black 10, white 9 and then pressing at black a would have given black the advantage, but the special feature of my go style is to invariably play all-out. In the past I often concentrated on making territory in my games, leaving weak groups to fend for themselves (shinogi). These games would be decided by the fate of the thin positions, fraught with danger. Because of this I was given the nickname "Shinogi Sakata". Recently I have made more of an effort to play thickly, adopting the happy mean, but I believe that I also continue to follow my instincts, to play allout.

Black 15 is an important cut. Of course, black's aim is to cut at the point of b.

At any rate, the game has gotten very busy. Both sides are walking a tightrope.




Figure 18 (109-116)

Figure 19 (117-120) White 18, preventing black from capturing with the ladder at a is natural. White 20 is also natural, protecting against the cut at b.

Well, what is the next move here?

There are three points that immediately catch one's attention, but which would the reader play?

First, curling around white's stones at black c. Second, jumping and attaching at black d. Third, playing the diagonal move at e.

Some factors must be kept in mind here, though: a white move at f is sente. Therefore, an atari at white g is also sente.

Predictably, black's second choice, at d, will be answered by the hane of white h, and black's third one, at e, by white i. Then, black can escape successfully with a knight's move at j.




Figure 19 (117-120)

Figure 20 (121-123)

Black 21 and 23 are the strongest moves. If 23 were played as the knight's move at a, black would be safe, and backing up a bit, turning at b with 21 would be safer still. Plunging deeply into the enemy's camp displays "youthful exuberance" in the best sense. Another detail is that since white c here is sente, playing black 3 and 7 in Figure 17 was regrettable.

Had they not been played, black can ride out the problem (shinogi) through 6 in Diagram 57.




Diagram 57




Figure 20 (121-123)

Figure 21 (124-129) After the hasty exchange of the two black moves for the two white ones, white 24 must be answered by black 25.

Consequently, white can play to surround black on a large scale with 28, and when black hops between white's stones with 29, anyone can see that there is a chaotic position on the board. From the sidelines it is impossible to tell which is the "killer", but each of the participants were confident of winning.

Well, how should white play here?

This is the most difficult phase of the game to play. It would be nice if black were forced to answer a move at a (kikashi), but at this time that is not the case. Playing against black's stone with white b somehow seems to make crude shape. From the viewpoint of shape, white c or else white d come to mind. What white must be wary of is the attachment across white's knight's move with black e. Please contemplate measures that avoid this.




Figure 21 (124-129)

Figure 22 (130-134) Go mulled over white 30 for forty minutes.

Black 31 took two minutes, white 32 eleven minutes, black 33 thirty-six minutes and white 34 thirty minutes. Therefore, to play the moves in this figure alone took two hours. This is the critical point in the game, so that is not unreasonable.

White 30 defends against the attachment across the knight's move. If white simply plays at 32, that attachment occurs with black 4 in Diagram 58. White struggles there but it is hopeless after black 12.

After the game Go related the thought that white 34 at a was the correct move.




Diagram 58




Figure 22 (130-134)

Figure 23 (135-142) At first glance it may appear that black's group is about to be smothered within the foe's position, but like a time bomb ticking, it has latent power that is aiming at white's group on the left with murderous intent.

It is as that model of "killing" that this game was particularly chosen for analysis here.

Pushing through and cutting on the right with black 35 and 37 are preparation for the attack on white to the left. How would the reader respond to white 42?

100 people out of 100 would answer black a no doubt, but that was not my move. In Part IV, on Killing Techniques, I counsel: "Do Not Worry About Outward Appearances", and in this kind of capturing race, where both sides are fighting on the edge of the blade of a knife to get ahead by even a single move, worrying about appearances or shape is meaningless.




Figure 23 (135-142)

Figure 24 (143-148) Black 43 is the only way to attack. If fastidious concern with shape leads black to pull out at 44, Diagram 59 results, and the race to capture (semeai) between white's group on the upper side and black's inside the white position becomes problematical.




Diagram 59

That is because of the sequence black a, white b, black c and white d on the upper side. Accordingly, black prevents the variation in this diagram while aiming to extend at e, which would expand the race to capture. Playing black f (43 in the figure) fills up a liberty, and I took pains over the move. Another thing: Go mentioned that, "White should have held 46 in reserve."

47

**con-
nects**




Figure 24 (143-148)

Figure 25 (149-159) I had read out the complicated variations here completely, and when white hane at 48, the moves to black 51 comprise a straightforward course. At this point it was clear that I had opted to finally pursue the race to capture. Black forces (kikashi) with 53 and 57, and then plays resolutely with 59. When involved in this kind of race to capture, playing moves like black 55 and 57 in the correct order is essential. Virtuosity in go very often involves playing the correct order of moves, and particularly in capturing races, the order in which one plays the moves can be pivotal. If one bungles the order in which one plays, a move that had to be answered earlier (kikashi), may become irrelevant. In response to black 59, white has two ways of answering, a and b. But if white a, black c. Or again, if white b, black a. The latter option leads to a capturing race between the two eyeless groups, but which will win? There is a ko involved with each group, so please read the situation out carefully.




Figure 25 (149-159)

Figure 26 (160-164)

White 60 is the only move.

If white pushes through with a, Diagram 60 ensues. Black 6 is a critically important move. This undermines white at the vital point, eliminating liberties at a single blow.




Diagram 60

With white 60, the race to capture (semeai) between the large groups on the left and right is more and more clear. Here black 61 and 63 is the correct order of moves. In this position, 63 must not be neglected. There is a huge difference between throwing in here in sente or allowing white to connect instead.




Figure 26 (160-164)

Figure 27 (165-171) The worst thing that can happen in a capturing race is that the opponent has an eye and you do not. Both black 67 and white 68 are the only moves. With this, everything is clear. Here we have a one move ko. That is, after the inevitable exchange of white a for black b, black has three moves to play on the left side: c, d and e. At the same time, white plays three moves at f, g and h; then taking the ko puts black's group in atari. The reader perhaps realizes that at that point the question of ko threats arises. I turned away for the moment to play black 71 to test white's response. It may be wondered whether something might not happen by leaving the main area of fighting at this point, but if the preceding analysis is understood, the reason is perhaps clear. Of course, white cannot play elsewhere (tenuki). Either i or j must be played in reply. Examining white's position on the right side further, black k is sente, so if white fills liberties with a and g, defects (bad aji) in white's own position appear.




Figure 27 (165-171)

Figure 28 (172-176) By this time I had already used my allotted nine hours and, feeling harried, was held to a minute per move (byo-yomi). Go had more than three hours left, so he still had plenty of breathing room, but by the end of the game he too had only thirteen minutes remaining, so it came down to the wire with Go as well.

White 72 is sensible. If white a, I planned to use black b and 72 as threats to fight the one move ko. On the right side, black 73 aims to provoke white c, and then, calculating that exchange as sufficient profit, black will at last start the one move ko.

Go's thoughts about this position —

"I was confounded by black 73. White 76 was a bit of a miscalculation."

It was already well into the night, and all about was deep silence.




Figure 28 (172-176)

Figure 29 (177-183) Go decided that capturing with white 79 would be disadvantageous, and so played elsewhere (tenuki), but now the right side gets caught up in the complications.

Here I moved out with 77 and the following.

Even if it should develop that the capturing race could not be won, black can use 77 and the others as sacrifice stones to secure territory on the right side. In addition, my strategy was to fill white's liberties in order to gain an edge in the ko fight in the center. Countering white 82 by cutting at once with 83 would be wrong. Diagram 61 shows why. Playing black 1 at a is the correct way...




Diagram 61




Figure 29 (177-183)

Figure 30 (184-200)

"Playing white 84 at 88 was the correct order of moves." In that case, black will likewise play 85 and the result is the same as in the figure. Therefore, I should have played at black 88 here, with the variation in Diagram 62 as the outcome. After black 7 in this diagram, white plays a, black b, white c, and then black takes the ko at d. Now there is no threat black will respond to; instead black will atari at f. However, besides playing at c, white can also connect at e. Black f, white g, black d follow, and white can use h as a ko threat.




Diagram 62




Figure 30 (184-200)

Figure 31 (Black's lamentable 201) The disposition of the right side went as black envisioned.

In the aftermath, before white moves against black in the center, first black's seven stones must be taken off the board to eliminate white's shortage of liberties. Hence white is forced to fight to win the ko on the left side.

Nonetheless, here I played a lamentable move. That was the connection of 1, representing *one move that lost one point*.

This is shown by the fact that if black takes the ko and finishes it by capturing the other stone, black 1 is not only unnecessary, it entails a one point loss. In the end, I lost the game by one point, but this is a minus I inflicted upon myself. While Go fell into thought over his own move, I realized the truth and —

"Aaah! Now I've done it!"

I blurted out inadvertently.




Figure 31 (Black's lamentable 201)

Figure 32 (202-219) The lamentable black 1 in the previous figure should have been used to defend against white 2 in this figure. If black cannot win the ko at 7, it would be necessary to connect at 1 anyway, so the essential thing is to limit the number of white's ko threats by playing at 2.




Diagram 63

When white gets to play 2, many ko threats are generated here. Answering at black a in Diagram 63 will still leave a threat at white b; then black c brings white d; if next black connects, white has a further threat at e.

Finally, black abandons the upper right, and in exchange at last kills the long-pursued group of twenty white stones. This is not paltry compensation, so the game is close and will be decided in the endgame.




Figure 32 (202-219)

Figure 33 (220-253) In this game, fortunes swayed one way, then the other, then back the other way, one daring variation followed another, and now in this figure still another big ko fight erupted on the lower side.

White 30 and the following moves correspond with a variation Go had read out earlier.

I also refused to give an inch. 35 and 36 produce a huge ko. If white wins it by capturing black 35 (ponnuki), white can kill the twelve black stones on the lower side by pushing through at a next. Thus, when black played 47 as a ko threat, it seems that Go considered making an exchange (furikawari). But then black will descend (sagari) at b, giving rise to further problems in the corner, and this he sought to avoid.

A couple of subtle details: white should not have played 28, and black should have used 27 to capture at 52 (ponnuki).




Figure 33 (220-253)

Figure 34 (254-280; subsequent moves omitted.) The game ended at 11:40 PM after 331 moves.

I had been held to a minute per move (byo-yomi) for the last 85 moves.

The writer observing the game made these comments:

Go 6 dan politely excused himself and left the room. Then Sakata 4 dan picked up the game record, jammed with moves, and poured over it. Frequently he would murmur, "Sure enough, a one point loss. Aah! No excuse!" with a vexed air —

I hope the reader appreciates my go style as a hotblooded, 19 year old 4 dan. Full of spirit, I killed a large group of stones of the top player in the world, and from that viewpoint, this was an interesting game.




Figure 34 (254-280)

The second game is the famous one between Shusai and Karigane, one that is surely known to every reader.

That is how famous this game is.

However, as famous as the game is, there are crucial turning points in the play, and personal aspects of this clash of titans, that are not sufficiently appreciated. And the vicissitudes of the contest illustrate in a more precise way than anything else the title of this work, "Killer of Go". Thus it comes in for a complete analysis here.

As the reader knows, the Nihon Kiin and the Kiseisha staked their fortunes on the outcome of the match, which started with the leaders of both groups engaging in battle. The daily schedule was as follows:

- First day — September 27, 1926
Black 53... play suspended
- Second day — September 28
Black 67... play suspended
- Third day — October 7
Black 125... play suspended
- Fourth day — October 8
Black 169... play suspended
- Fifth day — October 12
Black 179... play suspended
- Sixth day — October 18
White 254... black loses on time

The time limit was set at 16 hours apiece. Shusai Meijin used 13 hours and 29 minutes, while Karigane Junichi 7 dan (at that date) overran his allotted time.

This game excited players everywhere like no other fighting game before. At the time it was thought to be absolutely impossible for the two players to meet across the board, but, "Shoriki Matsutaro, president of the Yomiuri newspaper was possessed with enthusiasm for go and a determination to do something

about it, and so for the sake of Honinbo Shusai Meijin and the profession itself, persuaded General Director Okura of the Nihon Kiin to let Shusai and his six disciples, who were fully prepared, to accept the challenge from the defectors, in the hopes of building a national kiin," this according to the 80 year history of the Yomiuri newspaper (published in 1955).

In Ueno and Hibiya Parks (Tokyo) and in Nakanoshima Park (Osaka), the Yomiuri erected large demonstration boards, three meters square, and had the moves of the game delivered as they were played. A sea of enthusiasts gathered and go fever was all the rage: it is said that the go stores sold out all their boards and stones.

The Yomiuri dispatched all of its famous writers to cover the game, and they each wrote from individual viewpoints, the following being the description of Muramatsu Shofu.

"Shusai Honinbo carries no more than 70 odd pounds on a small frame and is extremely thin. His hair is nearly 70% white, he wears glasses with large lenses for his nearsightedness, and has a stiff, dignified-looking moustache. For his part, Karigane 7 dan is a rather big man, stout and powerfully built. His hair is cropped almost as short as a monk's, his round face has gentle features but his nose is straight and his eyes glisten sharply. In Shusai Honinbo's hand is a white fan graced with a Chinese poem, while Karigane's sports a black Chinese-style fan. The only discrepancy to this impression is the thick, white belt that the Honinbo wears, in distinction to the delicate, mahogany-colored one of Karigane's. Both are dressed in traditional silk jackets and striped pants."

At that time I was in the first grade in elementary school. I did not become a disciple of Masubuchi Tatsuko Sensei until I was in the third grade, so concerning go, I was just a tadpole then. I would merely watch as my father, who loved the game, played friends.

15- Shusai v. Karigane game

(September, 1926; Karigane plays black/fixed color)

Figure 1 (1-15) At the time of this game, people who didn't even know how to play were smitten by go fever. This was because of white's ferocious attempt to kill black's large group of stones on the lower side and the large ko fight that resulted. Kikuchi Hiroshi wrote that

"This game garnered considerable fame with the general public. Even my colleagues at the Bungeishunju publishing house such as Sasaki Mosaku or Naoki Sanjugo, whose knowledge of go was questionable, realized that, 'black seemed to be in trouble, and if black died the game was lost, if not, black would win.'"

With this kind of reaction, the event was deemed a great success.




Figure 1 (1-15)

Figure 2 (16-25) According to Shusai Honinbo,

"White 24 was very dangerous, I realized later. The reason is that at this time black can butt against white at a, then white b, black c, white d and black e results. Now, white must choose between playing f or g. If white extends at f, black can contemplate the move at h. Regardless of this, when black draws back to 25, white 24 becomes a forcing move (kikashi)."

Master Karigane Junichi stated,

"I wanted to butt against white with black 25 at a, followed by white b, black c, white d and black e, but then white extends with g, and white's thickness turns the lower side into a large territorial framework (moyo). On the other hand, white's stone on the upper side is perfectly situated, so black cannot put the thickness made here to use. Drawing back with 25 was a lukewarm move, reluctantly played, but I decided to patiently endure the situation for a bit."




Figure 2 (16-25)

Figure 3 (26-38) White 28 through 34 is played in preparation of 36 on the left, which ambitiously aims to build a large territorial framework (moyo) on the lower side.

However, in my opinion the moves to white 34 represent a territorial loss that one undertakes with trepidation. I would have chosen to play 28 at white 1, etc., in Diagram 64. The indirect cause of the necessity later to kill all of black's stones on the lower side was white's grand plan of 28 through 34 in this figure, a scheme that is dangerous to oneself as well as the opponent.




Diagram 64




Figure 3 (26-38)

Figure 4 (39-47) Shusai Honinbo declared:

"Black 45 was an unexpected move. I had thought that he would push up at 46, though I still hadn't considered what I would do in that case. Next, black 47 was unexpected as well, and I had envisioned a move at a.

Master Karigane's asserted that,

"I was greatly perplexed as to how to play black 43, and it took me more than an hour to decide on the move. The reason was what happened later on. I wondered if I should have played at black a instead of 43. I felt that this would have been a good move, but upon further thought, the prospect of having white then play a diagonal attachment at 43 and drive my stones into the center was disagreeable to me.




Figure 4 (39-47)

Figure 5 (48-53) The first day's play was suspended here. Next, it is inevitable for white to press above of black 53, but is black answers by connecting solidly




Diagram 65

in a line, the group is alive. Diagram 65 can be expected. If white uses 5 to hane at 6 here, attempting to kill the group, black cuts at a and at 11, and then black can prove white's moves unreasonable by attaching across the knight's move at b. But Master Karigane was dissatisfied with this diagram and resisted more strongly.




Figure 5 (48-53)

Figure 6 (54-57) This figure shows all of the moves played on the second day. Black 67 was the last move played here and the game did not continue until eight days later. When you think about it, this is a difficult point at which to suspend the game.

White 60 shows clearly that Shusai Honinbo's intention is to kill this black group. When white hanes at 64, black has no chance to make two eyes.

Master Karigane played all-out with 55 and 59, never imagining for a minute, as he said, that white would immediately try to capture the group. For his part, Shusai Honinbo suggested that before playing at 64, white should have exchanged a for black b on the left side.

But since in that case black's escape route is cut off, white a would be answered by black c, and then if white d, black weathers the crisis (shinogi) with b.




Figure 6 (54-57)

Figure 7 (68-78) Players today will find two conditions under which this game was contested difficult to understand. First, the fact that the opponents did not play on equal terms, with alternating colors. Then, the lack of a sealed move. At present, even if a 9 dan plays against a 3 dan, they will play alternating colors and giving a komi, and if the game has to be suspended, one will seal a move. This was a challenge match, however, and played according to conventions established long ago. Master Karigane did not seem bothered by these matters. On the board, there are ominous signs of impending death, with white pressing as hard as possible to kill black. In reply to black 73, white plays 74, which, from the standpoint of proper shape, makes one cringe, but for the purpose of both saving the three stones to the right and protecting the cutting point to the left, is the only move. In "killing" situations, neither oneself nor the opponent can pay attention to appearances. This is a powerful move distinctly typical of Shusai Meijin.




Figure 7 (68-78)

Figure 8 (79-89)

Please peruse this page and the next for a panorama of the situation. Black cuts with 79, counterattacking by filling liberties, and although prospects are for an arduous battle, there is no other way. The moves to white 100 flow in a rush.

If white 100 is played at 1 in Diagram 66, black 2 and 4 annihilate the whole group. At that point white jumps to 100, having read out the win.




Diagram 66

84
con-
ects




Figure 8 (79-89)

Figure 9 (90-100)

That is, if black blocks at 1 in Diagram 67, white makes a rigid connection at 2. When black plays 9, white takes the ko and no threat will be answered: black's 16 stones will end up being captured.

White had read out this sequence around the time of move 64.

However, Master Karigane played a splendidly diabolical move here: the hane into white's position that comes next.




Diagram 67




Figure 9 (90-100)

Figure 10 (101-109) Black played the diabolical hane at 1 and things became more and more difficult and bewildering.

At white 6, pushing through as in Diagram 68 leads to white's destruction. Therefore, white connected to the lower left with 6 and 8 in the figure. The question is whether, before playing 5, black could have played the atari at 6 as a forcing move (kikashi). In that case, the situation is as in Diagram 68, but instead of 1, white hanes at 7, and things will not go well for black.




Diagram 68




Figure 10 (101-109)

Figure 11 (110-112) Shusai Honinbo spent 1 hour and 37 minutes in long thought over white 12, and then resolutely extended. If white played 12 at a, black b and white c lead to the capture of black's group on the lower side. However, then black will play d, white e and black 12, making a powerful capture (ponnuki) that leaves no weaknesses (aji). In addition, afterward black can play f, white g, black h and white i. Black's group is still dead, but the corner now contains a double ko, which is an inexhaustible source of ko threats. This will be an onerous burden for white during the shifting exigencies of the game. So white doggedly pushed through with 12, setting up the deciding confrontation. The variation he had read out, with next black d, white e and black b, is the one that occurred in the game, and if black makes a solid connection at j, white will descend (sagari) once again, to k and fight. At this point, each move has a bearing on the life and death of these groups.




Figure 11 (110-112)

Figure 12 (113-115) According to Shusai Honinbo, "If black had connected at a instead of 15, I intended to descend (sagari) at white b, black fills the ko and white c.

Master Karigane stated,

"15 was reckless. This should be a connection at a. If white takes the ko, it entails a small loss, but it also yields an extra move in the ko fight, which black must win and connect without fail. The ko threat at d gives black the edge."

Recently, new analysis by Go Seigen shows that Shusai Honinbo's descent (sagari) of white b would be advantageously answered by black c. Contradicting this, Kitani declares that consequently white must answer black a, not with b, but by turning at e. In any event, the game is still a long way from being decided, so one cannot say anything at this point.




Figure 12 (113-115)

Figure 13 (116-125) As an afterthought to the debate on the last page among the various Senseis, I offer Diagram 69, where white connects the ko with 1 and the moves to 3 can be considered. Next black a, white b and black c is sente, so all six of white's stones in the right side of the center will probably die. In the figure, white 20 is an admirable ko threat.




Diagram 69

Ko:
19,
22;
24
con-
nects




Figure 13 (116-125)

Figure 14 (126-129) The fourth day's play commenced with this figure, but on this day black quickly made a bad move. Black 29 is the culprit; it leaves all sorts of defects (aji) that can be exploited. The (ponnuki) capture at a had to be played.

If black makes this capture at a, in the race to capture (semeai) on the lower side, black can at any time play b, white c and black d, putting the ko fight into effect. That gives black a lot of freedom to resist strongly in the center. In short, even if white plays e, black f, white g, black h, white i, black connects, white j, black can attach at k, and if white l, cross-cut with black m. Then, the worst that could happen is that black might be forced to use the ko in the lower left mentioned above as an emergency measure, in order to take two moves in the center to get out of trouble (shinogi). This analysis was made by Go Seigen, but I too believe that 29 at a would have given white an unexpectedly difficult time.




Figure 14 (126-129)

Figure 15 (130-169) Play on the fourth day was suspended at move 69 in this figure.

Because of the greedy move of black 29 in the last figure, the placement move of white 36 is possible, and black cannot intercept at 38. If black does play 38, the variation with white 64, black 39, white 41, black 40, and white 55 leads to a seki between the large groups on the lower side, but white kills black in the center, making the seki collapse.

Therefore, in the end white must be allowed to connect with 38, and the position turns from a direct ko into a one move approach ko. In this situation, a difference of one move is tremendous.

However, Master Karigane still had not given up hope, and playing the diagonal attachment of 69 aims to exploit the thinness of white's position. Regardless of the approach move ko, white still is not completely safe.




Figure 15 (130-169)

Figure 16 (170-200) In this figure, black plays with exquisite skill to link the result of the game to the ko fight. When white cuts on the upper side with 88 and 90, it may be thought that the game is over, but black plays 95 in a masterful sequence moves, and with that black is unconditionally alive. Concerning black's drawing back at 87 on the right side, anyone seeing this would consider the move at a to be more profitable, but Master Karigane had his sights on filling a liberty at b in the lower left and precipitating the ko fight, so the intention was to limit the ko threats at white's disposal.

Let's double-check the situation on the lower side. Black plays b, white c, black recaptures, white fills the liberty, black d, white takes the ko, black makes a ko threat, white responds, black takes the ko, white makes a move somewhere, black makes the approach move at e, and it becomes a full-fledged ko. The fifth day ended with move 79. The remaining moves were left for the sixth day.




Figure 16 (170-200)

Figure 17 (201-254: Black loses on time) Black lives skillfully on the upper side with 1 through 9, and the game is close. If 15 had been played in the lower right at 48 the outcome would be unclear. In that scenario, white could adopt inflexible attitude and try to take black's eyes away as in Diagram 70, but again a ko fight will take place. After black 8, white will play a and black b. As the game entered this figure, black was pressed for time, and played moves like 25 which lost points, making the difference greater. Shusai Honinbo's final thought was that if the board was counted, it would be a 6 point win.




Diagram 70

13:

re-takes:

14:

atari;

Ko:

18,

21,

24,

29,

32;

42:

con-

nects




Figure 17 (201-254)

At the time of this challenge match, Shusai Honinbo Meijin was 53 years old and Master Karigane was 48.

Extracts of descriptions by various literary figures follow.

•Mikami Otokichi "The Honinbo Meijin puts one in mind of the legendary Chinese warrior-statesman Komei, while Karigane evokes images of Tokugawa Ieyasu. The former has a dark complexion and an elongated face, with a somewhat nervous personality, and this nervous energy seems to be a driving force with him. The latter has a stout build and sports an air of satisfaction. His languid eyelids droop to a close upon frequently beautiful eyes, which at times flash with such a brightness, that they must truly strike fear in the hearts of opponents."

•Kodama Kagai "The Honinbo sits with a heavy fan spread open leaning against his hip. Karigane's habit is to balance his right hand on top of his fan placed in his lap. At difficult points in the game, an idea will occur to Karigane, and as if thunderstruck, he will prop himself up on one powerful knee, and in a pose like a stage actor portraying the warrior Hatakeyama Shigetada, sit as rigid and alert as if on duty for a daimyo. At the same time, the Honinbo's white fan looks like a chrysanthemum or a cherry blossom in bloom. Karigane 7 dan often shifts his shoulders. The Meijin Honinbo sits erect and unmoving."

•Terao Sachio "The 7 dan absent-mindedly grasps the pleats of his traditional Japanese pants and squeezes hard. There is a grim arch in his raised eyebrows. He sighs expressively across the go board. His eyes narrow and it seems like the creases at the corners will burst. Shusai Honinbo bends his upper torso over the low board, clasps his hands, and cocks his head to the left. A drop of oily sweat trickles below the Meijin's ear,. Then, suddenly, the official observer, Takabe Dohei 6 dan, stands stiffly and states in a clear voice, 'The time limit has been violated, so regrettably, the game is over.'"

At the end of the game, Shusai Meijin was admitted to a hospital in poor health.

IV — Killing Techniques

16- Retsugen v. Senchi game.....	173
17- Shuho v. Tetsujiro game.....	176
18- Go v. Fujisawa (Hosai) game.....	179
19- Sakata v. Rin Kaiho game.....	183

In this chapter the subject of this work, "killing", is illustrated with tangible techniques.

For those who willy-nilly find themselves inside the ring, and aspire to floor opponents with a knockout punch, here, divided into individual sections, are ten essential points that must be mastered.

Section 1 Train Your Eye!

In Western movies the dashing figure of the gunman relies, for the effectiveness of his gunplay, on two crucial factors. That is, in moments of crisis, he is quicker to the draw than anyone, and he is dead-eye on the draw, more proficient than anyone in hitting a target.

In a showdown, being 0.1 second faster than one's rival has life and death implications. A 0.1 second difference means a flesh wound administered by the rival, but a mortal blow given in return; the difference of victory.

This superhuman quickness on the draw is achieved by a regular, relentless training regimen, not one or two days of desultory effort.

I can read out variations relatively quickly, so it is said of me that Sakata can see twenty moves ahead at a glance. But if it weren't for the accumulation of observations beforehand, day in and day out, and kept in reserve in the memory, that this shape is dead, this is alive, or this ko, it would be impossible to make judgments in a matter of moments during confusing board positions or difficult life and death situations.

Accordingly, the first prerequisite of the "killer" is akin to the gunman's quick draw, faster than anyone's, in that the go player must be faster than anyone to ascertain the truth concerning the life and death of stones.

That is, it is necessary to cultivate one's skill at solving questions at a glance, in other words, life and death problems (tsume-go). It is recommended that amateurs assimilate the "Gokyo Shumyo" (authored by the quasiMeijin, the 11th generation

Hayashi Genbi; published in 1812). It was published more than 150 years ago, but it contains basic life and death shapes, and is invaluable in game situations. Unless one first fixes the complete Shumyo collection in mind, one will not attain the qualifications to make one feared as a "killer".

However, even a fairly strong amateur player will have trouble solving all of the problems in the Shumyo correctly on the spot. If not, that is quite alright. After some days pass, one must take up the challenge again, and then yet again later, until in the end one masters the whole anthology.

In a real battle, amateurs will hallucinate that stones lacking eyes are alive, will believe that stones are unconditionally alive when a ko is in the offing; there are countless examples. It is at that time that the "killer's" power comes to the fore. Therefore it is critical for the "killer" to develop an insight regarding life and death situations that is a cut above normal.

It is this insight which in boxing would be a murderous punch. And as in boxing one improves one's punch by training with a sandbag, in go one tackles life and death problems to augment this faculty, one's punch.

Furthermore, with one's eye trained through life and death problems, when an opponent optimistically takes the life of a group for granted and plays elsewhere (tenuki), the "killer" must weigh the value of immediately killing that group with high level, real game strategy. Concerning these points, later sections, "Fatten the Calf" and "An Ideal Model of Ambushing", will serve for reference.

Section 2 Develop Your Reading Strength!

The gunman's precise marksmanship becomes precise *reading* in the case of go. The one thing we professional players fear most of all is dubbed "self-deluded reading", where one arbitrarily decides on a course of play regardless of the opponent's moves; the sin of misreading.

"Aaah! Now I've done it!"

With this, one slaps one's knee in vexation as a large group of stones not only lives, but the investment one has made in the effort comes to nought. The hero of a Western commands the audience's applause not only with his skill and grace on the draw, but with his marksmanship, the shot that reaches its mark without veering a centimeter off course. Whether one can make a move with the speed of a god or not, if that move fails to hit its target, one has accomplished nothing. If, as a "killer" one goes after a group with the blatant intention of capturing it, and through a subjective misreading of the variation that kills the opponent is afforded a saving procedure (shinogi), the exercise is futile.

However, in reality it is virtually impossible to avoid this kind of misreading. Examining the game records of professionals, one finds that this sort of miscalculation occurs in countless cases. In the present age of games played with time limits, there are instances of pressure by the clock causing mistakes, but they crop up everywhere, at every point in the game.

Actual examples of famous blunders will be shown on the following pages.

The first game concerns an exquisite ladder block that was overlooked by both players, and pointed out later by an observer.

16- Retsugen v. Senchi game

(May 1788; Senchi plays black/fixed color)

Figure 1 (1-36) This is a game between the tenth generation Honinbo Retsugen and the seventh generation Yasui Senchi, who both became quasi-Meijin. At this time Retsugen was still 7 dan, while Senchi was 6 dan. The successor of this Senchi (afterwards called 5enkaku) was Genjo, whose name is linked with the eighth generation Chitoku.

This game started with a difficult fight to get one move ahead in the upper left corner. There is a delicate relationship among the ladders that materialize in the area. Regarding the cut at 35 in the figure, Hayashi Genbi 8 dan later offered the criticism that, "It would have been better to play black a without cutting." Also, Genan Inseki criticized the move at 19, saying, "This is heavy. It is best to play elsewhere, discarding the stone at 15."




Figure 1 (1-36)

Figure 2 (37-55) In the actual game, play came to a pause after white 54 and black 55. The continuation was white a, black b, white c, black d, white e, and in the end black won by 13 points, but at the time Wakayama Ritcho 3 dan (later, Rikkan 5 dan of the house of Inoue) was observing the game and said,

"If 54 had been played as on the next page, it would have been a ladder break in both directions, solving white's difficulties (shinogi)."

Retsugen and Senchi were astonished, and immediately set to analyzing the variations, inspiring the heading:

"Both Men, Faces Red, Confounded" in Genan Inseki's work, "Igo Myoden".

There is truly a vast array of techniques in go and we professionals are constantly confronted with unexpected moves that take one's breath away.





Figure 2 (37-55)

Hypothetical Diagram (1-3) The moves that Ritcho 3 dan pointed out were the ones in this hypothetical diagram. White 54, attaching at 1, then when black plays 2, white 3, filling a liberty and not worrying about outward appearances, is an incredible ploy to get out of trouble (shinogi).

If after this black plays at a, white b, black c, and white d; then if black e, white f. With this, white manages to avoid (shinogi) all of the ladders and right here the game would have been decided.

In the future, both players advanced to the status of quasi-Meijin, and this game is famous as the one with the "double quasi-Meijin mistake".

This game was played more than 200 years ago, but turning to more recent times, there is another renowned oversight by giants, in this case the players were Murase Shuho and Kobayashi Tetsujiro, and the story begins on the next page.



Hypothetical Diagram (1-3)

17- Shuho v. Tetsujiro game

(November 1885; Tetsujiro plays black/fixed color)

Figure 1 (1-100) Master Murase Shuho along with Kobayashi Tetsujiro founded the Hoensha in 1879, reviving the declining fortunes of the go world. This game was played between Murase, president, and Kobayashi, director, and published in Bulletin 46 of the "Igo Shinpo" (Go News Report). The oversight arose in the lower right corner.

According to Shuho's assessment,

"Both sides believed that there was no way to kill the lower right corner unconditionally. Since this group can be killed unconditionally, white 22 through 26 are better left unplayed. And because black was unaware of the fatal move there, 93 should have been used to defend at 96." An unusual analysis, to be sure (taken from Hayashi Yutaka's Encyclopedia).




Figure 1 (1-100)

Figure 2 (1-23; subsequent moves omitted.) This game ended in a 2 point win for white. In the lower right corner, after black 21 and white 22, there is a ko with black a, white b, and black c, but should black lose the ko the damage would be substantial, so Tetsujiro 7 dan could not take that step. Descending (sagari) with black 19 at 1 in Diagram 71 would kill white unconditionally. When white plays 4, throwing a stone in at the vital point of black 5 is a diabolical move, and if white a next, please confirm for yourself that black b eliminates the possibility of an eye here. Master Shuho had attained quasi-Meijin status but refused to accept promotion to Meijin; an exceptional individual. Even someone of his ilk could not avoid mistakes.




Diagram 71




Figure 2 (101-123)

No matter how outstanding a player may be, the fact that one is human means that misreadings, mistakes will occur.

A disciple of the go saint Dosaku, who became successor to the House of Inoue, Kuwahara Dosetsu, as Meijin Inseki authored a famous work, "Hatsuyo Ron", also called "Fudan-zakura". This was published by means of a wood block press around 280 years ago in 1714. It is an immortal masterpiece, but even here there is a famous error.




Diagram 72

Diagram 72 is it. Black to play. Black 1 to 3 is unavoidable. Now, it white a, black b, white c, then black d secures life. But the composer overlooked a mundane, easily neglected maneuver that kills.

That is, white 1 and 3 in Diagram 73. By simply connecting, black is denied life. "Black to play and die" fails to impress in a problem (tsume-go). Professionals, every one of us, have had bad experiences like this.




Diagram 73

A famous example in recent times transpired when Go and Fujisawa were battling for supremacy in a ten game match (jubango). This confrontation was touted as the "match of the century", but in the very first game both players made a mistake in a race to capture (semeai) between two big groups of stones. This was more accurately characterized as the "mistake of the century". No doubt the reader also remembers this, but let's take a look back on the matter.

18- Go v. Fujisawa (Hosai) game

(October 1951; Fujisawa plays black)

Figure 1 (1-66) Hosai was still known as Kuranosuke then. At the time I was 7 dan. The two 9 dans were titans engaging in mortal combat to beat the other down a rank, and aroused enormous interest. The playing site was the Rin-O Temple in Nikko, and the recorder was the late Shioiri Itsuzo 4 dan.

In those days, ten game matches (jubango) were played without komi, and took three days to complete. Figure 1 shows the point where play was suspended on the second day, making black 67 the sealed move. The problem occurred in the upper left corner.

Both 9 dans erred and it was the recorder Shioiri who made the discovery. Before turning the page, the reader is asked to think about the disposition of this corner.




Figure 1 (1-66)

Figure 2 (67-90) With white 90 in the upper left corner, the race to capture (semeai) is lost for black, or so the players believed. Hosai then played black a, white b, black c, but when white added a move at d, he resigned. Of the allotted time, black had already used up all 13 hours, and this may have also been a factor.

However, this race to capture is won for black.

In short, if Diagram 74 was played following white 90 in the figure, all was well. From black 1 to white 8, capturing four stones is straightforward, but black 1 in the next diagram hits a blind spot.




Diagram 74





Figure 2 (67-90)

Hypothetical Diagram (1-3) Black 1 in this diagram was overlooked by both players during the game because of its obscure placement.

That is, both players calculated the capturing procedure according to the rule of thumb normal in a four point eye formation (nakade): "If a group has a single eye with 3 internal liberties, 3 moves are needed there to capture; if 4, 5 moves; 5, 8 moves; 6, 12 moves."

However, the four point eye formation here is affected by the unique circumstances in the corner. From within the corner itself black can play atari. Usually one must capture the two stones from the outside and let white recapture. Then black plays atari on the outside, which is a completely different procedure. Further, if white plays at 3 before black does in this diagram, black adds a stone within the eye. Then white can play at 2, but this becomes a disadvantageous approach move ko. Anyway, this was an historical oversight for the two 9 dans.



Hypothetical Diagram (1-3)

As shown above, instances where participants in a game overlook something that an observer notices are not infrequent. This conforms to the proverb: "An onlooker sees twice as much."




Diagram 75




Diagram 76

When I was still 7 dan, I was praised for pointing out a resource that my elder colleagues, Hasegawa Akira and Takahashi Toshimitsu, had not read out during a game.

Diagram 75 shows the sequence in the game; it was thought that Diagram 76 would lead to ko. After the game, I suggested that black 1 and 3 in Diagram 77 would secure life unconditionally for black. This move at 3 is the kind that is a little hard to visualize. The continuation

in Diagram 77 ends with white losing stones. What is more, without the added white stones in Diagram 76, the moves in Diagram 78, sequentially from black a through i, produce a deadly ko.




Diagram 77




Diagram 78

19- Sakata v. Rin Kaiho game

(May 1967; Rin plays black)

Figure 1 (1-2) It is impolite to only bring up others' misplays, so here an error that Rin Kaiho Meijin and I made is presented. Avid go fans will perhaps remember this one. It happened in the third game of the 22nd Honinbo Title Match held at the Awara hot springs in Fukui Prefecture.

In this figure, white 1 is the 130th move. Rin Kaiho Meijin mistakenly believed that white had a play in this corner. Both sides were in time trouble (byo-yomi), and somewhat flustered as we made our moves, but playing white 1 here was terrible. If it had been answered correctly, all of white's stones would have died. But black was lured into making the bad move at 2 and white escaped from the jaws of death.




Figure 1 (1-2)

Figure 2 (3-7) In the previous figure, white had to play directly at 3, omitting 1. That way white could take advantage of a misreading by black of possibilities in the corner. However, black 2 in that figure fell in line with white's blunder, allowing the expedient of white 3 here, and white is unconditionally alive in the corner. This establishes white's advantage in the game.

This works because even if black pushes through at 6 with 4, white a, black b, white c, black d, white 4, black e, white f ends with black's four stones captured.

Regardless of this, white 1 in the previous figure was awful. White had to exchange 3 for black 6 in this figure and then descend (sagari).

Therefore, how should black have played to punish white's error? That will be shown in the following hypothetical diagram.




Figure 2 (3-7)


Hypothetical Diagram (1-7) Connecting underneath with black 1 is a severe move, and with it white's group in the corner is annihilated.

The young player, Abe Yoshiteru 6 dan, while scanning the advance reports of this game in the newspaper, discovered this move. Hearing about it afterward, I said,

"Indeed! It was that dangerous, was it?"

Even now the thought sends chills down my spine. If black 1 to 7, white cannot make two eyes. The descent (sagari) of white 1 in Figure 1, in itself destroyed the group's eye space.

Also, if white plays 2 at 3, black attacks with a, white 4, black 2, white 5, black b, white c, black d, white 6, black 7, and again white cannot live. The result of this game hinged upon the question of life and death here, so this was truly a treacherous misreading.



Hypothetical Diagram (1-7)

The purpose in presenting so many examples of mistakes in actual games is to stress the importance of precise reading when setting out to kill the opponent's stones. We professionals will spend two or even three hours in deep thought over a single move, and it is this reading into which we have plunged. During the course of one's reading, it may become apparent that a ladder will develop which is unfavorable. Therefore, before initiating that sequence, one plays a ladder break. Or one may realize that a position becomes ko, but that one's ko threats are insufficient. Then, before the fact, one creates material for the ko fight. In every case, one reads out the proper order of moves completely, then, after advance preparation, one goes after the grand prize without reservation.

The side being killed will fight with desperate strength, using every means possible to hack a way out. In order to deal with this resisting wild boar run amok, one must have controlling preparations in place - in other words, precise reading. This precise reading is absolutely essential for the sharpness of vision and stability described in Section 1. Please keep in mind that one must avoid misreadings at all costs so that one's shape does not become over-concentrated.

Section 3 Do Not Worry About Outward Appearances

Ardent go fans may be divided into two large factions: the group possessing powerful fighting strength, and the one putting more store in good shape. Probably every reader will say at once,

— "Ah! I'm in the fighting strength group." or else,

— "Ah! I'm in the good shape group." recognizing one's strong point.

Among professionals, typically the ones who study systematically exhibit good shape, while those who use their own methods to improve wield fighting strength.

And the flip side of this fact is that those who make good shape are comparatively weak in fighting, those possessing fighting strength make comparatively poor shape. The good shape contingent plays little Lord Fauntleroy style at the same time the strong fighters resemble mountain men.

Nonetheless, I would like to point out that when launches an attempt to kill an opponent's stones, the mountain man approach is best. The reader saw in Part III that white 1 in Diagram 79, which Shusai Meijin played with deadly intent against Master Karigane, was a strong move. Undoubtedly, from the standpoint of shape, a is the vital move. It makes *bad shape*.




Diagram 79

But in a race to capture (semeai) this kind of bad shape may be necessary to force matters. It is a strategy one must not disregard.

There are many instances of this, particularly when the absence of a move that fills a liberty will allow stones to be trapped with a fencing-in move, or in ladder relationships.

An empty triangle is prototypical of bad shape, but when killing in a real game an empty triangle is not infrequently useful.

The key point is: "Do not worry about outward appearances".

A phrase currently in vogue among young people is "looking dynamite", but in killing games one must not consider how things look at all, the critical objective is to go for the kill, disregarding outward appearances. In addition, this kind of move that ignores appearances at times is diabolically effective, and its unexpected nature may cause the opponent to overlook it.

An example is a move that I played in one of my games that came in for a lot of praise. This is shown on the next page in Diagram 80, the stratagem of poking from above with white 1.

My move defies logic, what is normal. in this type of position. An inquiry was made of Go Seigen, the official observer of the game, as well as the professionals in the analysis room, and white's move at 1 was never considered. My opponent, the erstwhile Meijin, Fujisawa Shuko, for a moment was even grate-




Diagram 80

ful for it. It is said that there is a razor-thin edge between an exquisite move and a blunder. Here perhaps is a manifestation of the phenomenon. White 1 in the diagram compels black a, white b, creating thickness in the center to counter black's in the upper left. The outcome of the game revolves around this factor, so black is in difficult straits. If white had played the routine move at c instead of 1, black would have hanged at d and now white is the one suffering.

In Diagram 80a, a poke from the outside is played against a one point corner enclosure. Logically, one would not play this move, since white has the opportunity to play a or b inside to test black's response. Consequently, white poking from outside is unorthodox, with the one




Diagram 80a

perpetrating such a move in danger of excommunication. On the other hand, Go Seigen played this kind of move with equanimity in the ranking tournament (Oteai) to score a notable win. The primary factor is to make every effort to win the game, so it is no good being a stickler for principles, whether those regarding bad shape or move order analysis (tewari), etc. The chief consideration for the killer is to disregard outward appearances, and this is emphasized here.

Section 4 Destroy the Opponent's Shape

Boxing aficionados know well that a knockout punch cannot be landed immediately. Preliminary skirmishes using jabs and other blows soften up the opponent, so that when one's chance comes one can seize the win.

Even a "killer" cannot possibly attempt to capture the stones of an opponent who has firmly stabilized those stone's shape.

Accordingly, one must destroy the opponent's shape. Diagram 81 shows a line of play that often appears in six stone games. When white caps, the handicap player will run away with black I ,




Diagram 81




Diagram 82

but any number of players will connect with the moves to black 5 in response to white's attack with 2 and 4.

Of course, readers to whom this book is directed already know that Diagram 82 is the correct way to play. Black 3 in Diagram 82 is, generally speaking, a model of bad shape, but in a real game situation it is a good move. Compared with Diagram 81, it is obvious that this is the method offers adequate resistance to white.

At any rate, it is necessary for white to handle matters so that the opponent's shape is destroyed as shown. With this preparation, a fierce attack next will prove terribly effective; black is altogether bereft of eye shape.

Stones have various and sundry vital points, and if those vital points are bolstered, the group is firmly anchored. But if this is neglected, and conversely those vital points are manipulated, one's stones suddenly get entangled and thrown into a state of chaos. Therefore, when making a study of go, learning standard operative shapes is extremely important.

Amateurs are surprisingly unaware of these standard operative lines of play, and end up choosing ineffective points to play their moves. We professionals call these inoperative shapes, or pointless lines of play. These inoperative shapes require a whole book of their own to explore thoroughly.

Section 5 Fatten the Calf

Whether one's ambitions as a "killer" unfold on a large scale or end up with paltry consequences, depends upon one's ability to put the substance of this section to practical application.

To get to the point quickly, this deals with ladders.

The instant one captures a stone in a ladder, the opponent will realize how things stand and become resigned to the situation, making it impossible to enlarge one's possible profit. However, one could hardly be more thankful for a mistake committed by an opponent than if it involves a ladder. The

reason is that for each stone added to the ladder, one's spoils increase visibly.

Concerning fruits or fish, say, there is a proper time to reap and consume them. If one harvests prematurely, the value is severely reduced. In particular, calves must be fattened before the slaughter.

If an opponent overlooks the fact that a group does not have eyes, should one gleefully set out to kill it?

A high level technique in go is to leave stones that can be captured as they are, and *humor the opponent*. A go proverb states: "Knight moves win running battles." If one chases stones with knight's moves, humoring the opponent into saving them, one can build up a large territorial framework (moyo), certainly a more fruitful approach than settling for a small scale kill.

The crux of the matter is that humoring the opponent and fattening the sacrifice considerably before butchering it is the more effective course. Essentially, during the shifting circumstances one must deal with, one adopts strategies that fit the situation, but take heed: do not nip the blossom in the bud. Furthermore, something else to explain here is that, as far as practical, one should make the opponent's stones *heavy*.

Since stones that are light are easily discarded, various extra plays make the stones heavy and exceedingly difficult to sacrifice. It follows then that one should make every effort to induce the opponent's stones into heavy shape and then force them to run away - that is the strategy. One should adopt these high level tactics at the earliest opportunity. In short, think of ways to play to fatten the calf.

Section 6 Chop Apart the Opponent Happily

Kitchen workers use chopping knives. A "killer" must also know how to skillfully wield a cleaver. Except, the cleaver is not used to kill. The knife referred to here is used to chop apart groups in preparation for the killer's arrival on the scene. Getting straight to the point, if the opponent's stones are all connected, then no matter what superhuman strength one possesses, it will be impossible to kill.

If the opponent's groups are divided into several parts, each of those parts must make eyes independently, multiplying the chances to kill, and for that reason one sinks the cleaver in.

From times of yore, players able to play well against handicaps have been masterful in chopping groups apart.

Let's examine a game from my praxis containing an example of chopping the opponent apart. In Diagram 83, I played white against Takagawa.




Diagram 83

Diagram 84 on the next page is the normal follow-up. I deviated here and played as in Diagram 85, inserting the knife with white 1. Black pushed in naturally with 2 (which is black's prerogative; neglecting to do so entails a loss), play proceeded to white's descent (ragari) at 9, securing life, and black 10.

With this move, white's one stone is captured. If white nevertheless tries to move out as in Diagram 86, the sequence to black 10 is the quietus.

White deliberately accepted a territorial loss in the upper right corner in order to plunge the knife in, but the cutting stone is captured and cannot move. The explanation is that because of this maneuver, defects are created.

That is, continuing as in Diagram 87, white plays 1. Then 3 and 5 are a technique that threatens to create a position where white's single stone that sliced the black group previously can be put in motion.

One aims at the like when chopping the opponent apart.




Diagram 84




Diagram 85




Diagram 86




Diagram 87

Section 7 Use Thickness to Win

I imagine that the reader is familiar with the joseki in Diagram 88. With a white stone on the 5-4 point, black has invaded at the 3-4 point, white then fenced black in with a knight's move, and sacrificed two stones. Seeing this joseki, would the reader want to play the white side, or is black's result more attractive?




Diagram 88

Of course, this joseki has been used by innumerable players, both past and present, with a 50/50 result, so it is not a matter of one side being better than the other. The advantages and limitations are determined according to the opening position, but in the local context, playing either side would not mean a loss.

Players being what they are, though, there are some who will prefer white and some who will conclude that black is better. White has thickness and black territory.

If one has a taste for territorial profit, one will gravitate to black, while the thickness faction will take white. Right now I will set down the first five joseki that come to mind in which thickness and profit are clearly differentiated. The reader is asked to look at them closely and consider anew the implications.

In Diagram 89, black 5 initiates a sequence which purports mainly to take profit. White 6 in answer was a new joseki invented by Takagawa. Black could have held 13 in reserve, aiming at the possibility (aji) of a poke at a but...




Diagram 89

Next Diagram 90.

Naturally the disposition of the upper right corner has ramifications here, but recently black's first move has elicited white's immediate attack at the 5-4 point with the second move, leaving the three other corners empty, and play developing into this joseki.

In that situation, which side appeals to the reader? In this position the number of moves played is different. Black has played seven to white's six. Thus, one extra move for white is good for an even arrangement. The impression that the profit in the upper left corner is exceptionally large, and that white's wall is insubstantial arises because one still cannot appreciate the power of thickness. Those people will see white in the following joseki and be put off even more. That is, Diagram 91 and Diagram 92. Both diagrams stem from the same basic sequence. The only difference is that in the upper diagram white has played one less stone, and in the lower one the number of moves is equal. We professionals are divided between those who feel that black is decidedly better in this joseki, and those who figure that the white side is playable. What does the reader think?




Diagram 90




Diagram 91




Diagram 92

Finally, there is Diagram 93.




Diagram 93

This is a large scale joseki. Black and white play the same number of moves. Countering black's 20-odd points of profit is the thick wall white builds. In the "Dictionary of Go" (by Suzuki Tamejiro) this is given with the caption white is thick.

Well then, let's arrive at a conclusion at last. In recent times the tendency is to put greater and greater emphasis on clinging tightly to territory. That is because, with komi, fights come down to a half point.

However, "killers" worth their salt value thickness, knowing that the future return of profit will be rewarding. This is in consideration of crisis conditions occurring, as when a race to capture (semeai) is in the offing. Then the power of thickness makes its presence felt, and one's offensive will develop satisfactorily. For instance, if ladder relationships come into question, walls become domineering forces.

A group on the side consisting of a two space extension is not easy to kill. Nevertheless, if the surrounding area suddenly becomes controlled by the adversary's thickness, those two stones are by no means secure.

"Killers" in the making who aspire to winning by knockouts are well-advised to concentrate on making thickness in the early stages of the game. Among professional players, Takagawa is noted for his thick and poised style of play.

Also, there is the matter of the late, great master of the Osaka area, Kubomatsu Katsukiyo. Master Kubomatsu's flair was for creating immense stretches of territory in the center. If one has the opportunity to play out a game of this master of old, it is recommended that one do so.

Section 8 Fight from a Position of Strength

Players enamored with their own strength, especially those with a tendency to overrate that strength, are inclined to attack unreasonably.

If the opponent caves in, that unreasonableness may carry the day, but that is definitely not a proper fighting stance.

In thinking about go, one must adopt a scientific and logical approach.

Consequently, when the "killer" goes for the fatal blow, it is after sufficient fighting against the opponent has created favorable conditions for it.

In contrast to the pieces in chess, stones in go are all identical; if there are five stones in the opponent's array and five stones in one's own, then the balance of power is equal. It is natural that one cannot do more than fight on a 50/50 basis.

If one's forces equal ten and the opponent's two, then a crushing battle will ensue.

If one thinks about this in the context of handicap go it is obvious. When there are many handicap stones, at the beginning, white is at a marked disadvantage. Hence, white cannot precipitate a seething brawl right at the start. First white must play over there, then over here, etc., gradually proceeding until a superior position is obtained, then white initiates hostilities. This is the way to play handicap go.

For this reason, the one taking the handicap must recognize the advantage one holds, and if white plays anything unreasonable, immediately challenge it. If one shirks the opportunity, white gets a robust position, while one's own winning chances are diminished.

Amateur players who pride themselves on their fighting strength quite often try to kill their opponent's stones without sufficient preparation. With eight of the adversary's stones matched against six of their own, they attempt to surround and kill. This is completely unreasonable. When the encircling net gets wrapped inside out in the complications, terribly over-developed shape (amari-gatachi) will result, emphasizing the failure.

Fighting demands that one always choose places where one is able to fight. No matter how much confidence one has in one's fighting strength, fighting unreasonably is useless.

One must make preparations slowly before attacking. If one has designs on a group of the opponent's in the center, one first determines the direction it will run towards when attacked, and then skillfully play an order of moves to block that route. This is an important high level strategy. The essential thing is that with the mouse in the trap, one can say, "Don't mind if I do," and then rob the opponent of eyes.

The Ten Precepts of Go instruct "Enter The Sphere Nice And Easy", "If The Opponent Is Strong, Protect Yourself" and "When Your Group Stands Alone Against A Powerful Force, Take The Peaceful Course" When entering the opponent's camp, one must not go in too deeply. If the opponent is strong, one first preserves the security of one's position. In situations where one's influence is negligible, engineer a peaceful settlement,,. in essence, the import is that one must never disregard the balance of power.

A "killer" must beware, above all, of bungling the kill and on the contrary, winding up killed oneself. "Chasing a deer, the hunter is blind to the mountains," goes an old saying. Concentrating on the prey, one may plunge in deeply, and before one realizes it turning back is impossible. At that point one's destruction is all but assured. For a "killer" to be massacred violates the primary tenet, and though one's family tree may not include Houdini, there is no excuse for this. Even in one's dreams one must not embark upon wild-eyed attacks.

On the other hand, if one has a superior position and the chance comes along to decide matters, one must take the bull by the horns, attack aggressively and relentlessly, without backing off for a moment. One must press the assault unwaveringly.

Section 9 Effective Use of Leaning Attacks and Two-pronged Attacks

A single weak group never dies is outstanding among the go proverbs, and there is a kernel of truth there that a "killer" must take to heart. Stones do not easily die.

In Part 1 it was shown how in individual games various large groups of stones ended up killed, but those groups did not, by and large, start out as single weak groups.

A single weak group refers to a situation where there are no other sources of concern across the board, when a group on its own would rarely die, but if additional weak stones appear in the surrounding area, making life as a result becomes problematical.

Right there is an invaluable element in the killer's arsenal.

Casting one's net over that surrounding area is the leaning (motare), the two-pronged (karami) attack. It is an attacking technique that those fans aiming to become dan players, not to mention dan players themselves, must necessarily master. In Sections 1 and 2 of this part, the reader was exhorted to train the eye and develop reading strength. Through the exercise of those faculties, whence a group is deemed killable and that course charted, one must next determine what steps to undertake towards that end. That is, prior to the final curtain one must prepare thoroughly in advance with leaning and two-pronged tactics. The gunman must first entice the adversary to favorable ground.

Here an example of leaning (motare) and two-pronged (karami) tactics from one of my games is shown. Leaning tactics, as the term implies, involves leaning against the opponent's stones, in an area *opposite the direction of one's true aim*. Diagrams 94 and 95 show common leaning sequences. Afterwards, white will attack black's one stone to the left, which was the original aim. The result of leaning on the right is that black's stones are concentrated on the right side, and conversely, power is built up for an attack toward the left. Diagram 96 is from the actual game. Black has just played the diagonal move in the middle of the upper side. The question is how black's two stones in the center will vie against white's two stones to the left. Seeing this diagram, does the reader believe that white is attacking black? Or is black attacking white? Depending upon how white answers here, the roles of attacking and defending are likely to change. White must take great care over the next move.




Diagram 94




Diagram 95




Diagram 96




Diagram 97

Pushing up with white 1 in Diagram 97 is a failure. The chief purpose of this move is solely self-protection. No pressure whatsoever is brought to bear on the opponent. After black 2, white 3, black 4, next white must jump to a. Letting black get the jump on white like this means that a golden opportunity to attack has been lost through overly defensive behavior. This is self-defeating. The knight's move of white 1 in Diagram 98 is also a failure. Naturally, this move seems to make the most sense, but jumping to black 2 and white 3 in tandem can be expected next, and with 4, already black's worries are over. The attacking conditions white had deliberately set up have dissipated into wasted chances. Additionally, the fact that black's position in the upper left corner is not threatened in the least is dissatisfying.




Diagram 98

The most effective method is to play the one space jump of white 1 in Diagram 99, leaning in this way on the left. What will happen here is black will play a, white b, black c, white d, black e, white f, black g and white h. At that point, if black cuts off white's four stones, white plays i to capture on a large scale. If black's stones in the center run away, white connects with the four stones to the left, now giving black's corner cause for alarm. At the same time as one uses a leaning tactic as above, the resulting large scale attack is dubbed "two-pronged" (karami). The go proverb that states, "There is no recourse (shinogi) when facing a three-pronged attack (karami)," is proof positive that nothing is more excruciating than undergoing this onslaught. In chess, it is a knight's maneuver that forks the king and queen. In the theater, it is Hamlet crying out, "The point envenom'd too! Then, venom to thy work," after the swordplay in the last scene. (Though perhaps the tragic sentiment does not go as deep here...) In general, a two-pronged attack aims at two groups of the opponent's stones with one move, and in a fight nothing is more effective. The thrill of go is in the attack, and the two-pronged attack is distilled essence of that thrill. However, if one uses this ideal opportunity clumsily, one ends up accomplishing nothing.




Diagram 99




Diagram 100





Diagram 101

For example, in Diagram 100 black attaches in the center with 1. How should white respond? Answering with the hane at white 1 in Diagram 101 falls in line with black's wishes. The up-shot is that white's group in the upper left has, on the contrary, become thin. If white is not careful, it seems like a two-pronged attack (karami) will develop to the left and right. The correct move is white 1 in Diagram 102. Then play proceeds with black 2 and white 3. In that case, black naturally needs to reinforce the group to the right, and the central group also needs attention. Black has a difficult game, facing a two pronged attack. Perhaps the reader can see here how important it is to play



in the correct direction and move order. One more real game example follows.




Diagram 103

I am playing white in Diagram 103. In the middle of the lower side, black has played a shoulder hit, and in response white has pushed up twice. Here I determined to assail black's three stones while exploiting the thinness of black's position to the right with a two-pronged attack (karami). At this juncture, black's group to the right is not wholly sound. I started by playing at the vital point at a. The result is shown in Diagram 104. It is natural for black to play 2 in answer to white's attack at the vital point in this diagram with 1. Following this, white 3 and black 4, and all the exchanges through 10 make up a practically forced variation. Then white vigorously pushes with 11 and the rest, dragging black along, and splits the opponent through the center with white 19 and 21, a splendid finesse (tesuji). Subsequently black played a and white b, but I hope the reader can appreciate the rhythm of this two-pronged attack.




Diagram 104

Section 10 An Ideal Model of Ambushing

I have written of various killing techniques. Training one's eye to be acutely sharp, developing superhuman reading strength, destroying the opponent's shape, while chopping the opponent apart, building thickness. Fighting from a position of strength, fattening the calf, leaning and using double pronged approaches, ignoring appearances when a race to capture (semeai) arises, and following the proper move order for the knockout punch. Nevertheless, speaking truthfully, the ideal of the killer is not to score a knockout after an awesome slugfest. The perfect kill is the one effected without direct contact with the opponent's group, but that strikes in the blink of an eye. In other words, an ambush killing. Casting an eye on the adversary's stones, and practically with that alone, they wither on the vine, is the artistry of a Meijin. This has to be the ultimate experience in killing. One fully realizes that a group has only one eye, yet imprudently gambles that one will somehow manage, but the battle rages here then there and things get complicated. When a lull is finally reached, and one finally takes stock, all of the escape routes of that group have already been blocked, and the group dies a mummified death. Amateurs will yelp "Aah! I forgot about that!" or words to that effect, but when one hears this lament, one should marvel at the skill that engineered the killing. Except, this is the ideal case, like bowling a perfect game, and it rarely comes to fruition. Still, the stronger the adversary one defeats with this ambush killing, the more it is to be cherished.

(Special Section) Mind Reading

Lastly, this special section is appended to the rest. If one can read the opponent's mind while playing a game, it is even more advantageous. Originally, go was a matter of playing the board. From a strictly logical standpoint, one routinely concentrated on playing a move that was the only move, regardless of who the opponent was, or whether that move delighted or dismayed the opponent. Those were completely irrelevant factors. It was fine as long as one played the best move on the board, and in truth, even if there was no opponent sitting on the opposite side, that was fine as well.

An actual example occurred in the mid-1920s at the same time as the Nihon Kiin v. Kiseisha match, during the ten game match (jubango) between Suzuki Tamejiro and Nozawa Chikuchō. From the second game, each played their moves in a separate room. Ostensibly, this arrangement was made because Master Chikuchō, who suffered from a respiratory disease, coughed at the board, disturbing Master Suzuki. Rumor had it, though, that Master Chikuchō's vituperative tongue was the cause. Whatever it was, the fact is that these games were played in different rooms.

In this instance, mind reading, the subject of this section, does not apply at all, and the moves were made solely on the basis of the board position, playing the best move possible. However, if I had to voice my opinion, I would say that even here the opponent's game psychology can be perceived. That is, even without the opponent sitting before one, the opponent's moves will eloquently convey the psychology of the moment. Seeing the adversary placidly surrounding territory without leaving defects (aji), one grasps that the other believes that winning can be obtained by making profit. If one is chased far and wide and one crisis follows another, one must resign oneself to the fact that making territory alone will not cut it.

Also, if the opponent takes no time to play but moves immediately, one can imagine that this is a preconceived plan, a line of play, along with the accompanying complications, that has been decided upon beforehand. And if the opponent takes a lot of time mulling over the next move and just will not play, surely that is proof that the opponent has fallen into a quandary. In this way, even if the opponent is playing in another room, the use of the stones and time is a giveaway.

Even moreso, when the opponent is sitting before one, whether or not grunts or groans are in evidence, the way a cigarette is held, or a refreshment is sipped, betrays a certain impatience or perhaps, otherwise, equanimity.

There one sees the opponent's heart - confident? despondent? Rocked by events? Steady as a rock? nothing beats such an opportunity to see right through defenses. For example, suppose the opponent misreads a group's life and death status. A cursory glance persuades that life is assured, leading to a play elsewhere (tenuki).

This kind of situation demands that one determine the true nature of the opponent's action: whether undertaken with full cognizance of the implications, or else, a complete misreading, believing the group to be alive. Here, especially, the discipline described in Section 1, reading skill, comes into play.

And then, if the opponent has in fact misjudged the matter, can one postpone the kill to rush to play in another critical area, leaving the finishing blow until the last moment; or does it seem like the mistake is about to be discovered and one should set to the kill right away? The answer depends on the individual strategy that each player develops independently, but regardless, it is important to be able to read the mindset of the opponent.

When the opponent is calculating the score, one knows immediately. Likewise, it is obvious whether, as a result, the opponent is optimistic or pessimistic about the game. The next move will necessarily reveal the conclusion reached. Moves can be largely divided into optimistic types and pessimistic types, and the one played will invariably betray the opponent's mental state.

When the opponent is thrown off kilter, a bad move will habitually result, so that once a bad move is played, another bad move will follow in its wake. Consequently, when one realizes that the opponent is bitterly regretting a move, that is one's

chance to go for the win. Leaving aside cases where a winning advantage is already in hand, where that is not so, but where one has a previously prepared killing move available, this is the perfect chance to open up hostilities. Game psychology encompasses truly subtle complexities.

Amateur players tend to make comments while watching a game being played, but even if a move only makes a one point loss, saying — „You made a one point loss there, huh,“ out loud will disturb a player and lead to still another bad move. If the comment was not made and the error not seen, then ignorance is indeed bliss.

The player is not upset and a bad move is avoided. Therefore, making comments while a game is in progress must be condemned as a faux pas. Furthermore, when the opponent has misread the life and death status of a large group of stones, if one of these blabbermouths happens along, a killer will be filled with trepidation. Even if nothing is said about the situation, an intent stare at the suspect area may easily alert the opponent that, "Whoops!“ something looks funny...

V — Killer of Go: Preventative Measures

- (1) Do Not Approach Strong Positions.....213
- (2) Effectively Sacrificing Positions.....215
- (3) Welcome! The Killer of Go!.....217

From Part I through Part IV I have discussed various aspects and aims and techniques of the "killer".

Now, in Part V, by way of summation, I would like to discuss countermeasures to use against the "killer" to protect oneself.

How is one to avoid the poisoned daggers of the "killer"?

Once more the vision of the killer in Western movies comes to mind. Consider what would happen if this killer and you come face to face in the central square of a deserted town. Just the two of you. There is not a single soul to come to your relief.

The figure moves with god-like, lightning speed to draw. And fires with unparalleled precision. What can one do to counter this?

The answer is simple.

You too must draw your gun in a flash and you must also be precise with your shot.

Regarding the life and death of stones, the killer possesses outstanding vision, with the ability to solve virtually any life and death problem at first sight.

You too must strive for exceptional vision regarding the life and death of stones. When confronted with a life and death problem, one must be able to say

— "Ah ha! This is the 'Hatsuyo Ron' (of Meijin Inseki)." — or else

— "Is it the 'Shumyo' (Hayashi Genbi). Perhaps the 'Seimyo' (same as above)." or again, in the case of the old Chinese classics

— "This is the 'Gengen Gokyo' or maybe the 'Kanzufu', no?" or when it comes to the modern age

— "This is the 'Shikatsu Myoki' (Shusai Meijin)."

— distinguishing at a glance earns one full credit; but even if one lacks that ability, one must be able to see a shape and instantly declare

— "Ah ha! This looks suspicious. There must be a move here," — exhibiting an awareness one must always maintain.

At the very least, one must be able to readily determine which stones are unconditionally alive and which may have some exploitable defects. If one has a group with suspicious aspects, one must connect it to a friendly position, or establish two eyes, insuring that no matter what move is played against the group, it will not die. The most frightening thing that can happen is that an impulsive misreading will convince one to leave a group alone without securing its life.

Accordingly, if one feels uneasy, one should play as safely as possible, connecting one's groups together. One of the killer's techniques is to chop groups apart with abandon, but if one fore-stalls that effort, connecting one's group over here, then one's group over there, then rather than having to secure two eyes for each group, everything is safe. In other words, if confronting the killer means that one will be slower on the draw and less accurate a shot than that adversary, one must from the start avoid a showdown in that town square. One sidesteps hand to hand combat. Only fools rush in where angels fear to tread.

In any event, it is essential that one develop one's vision vis-a-vis life and death, and one's reading ability as it pertains to capturing races (semeai).

No matter how cleverly one plots one's strategy, or how skillful one's opening (fuseki), after all, a game is won with fighting strength. Go is based on power. So all fans of go are urged to put aside some time, however small, devoted towards building strength through the study of life and death problems (tsume-go) and expert technique (tesuji).

Another thing one must beware of, in a very real sense, when playing with a killer, is a shortage of liberties. A shortage of liberties is often the prelude to the sudden death of a group of stones. One must take care that one does not fill liberties that are better left open until later.




Diagram 105

An example follows: I took advantage of my opponent's shortage of liberties to win a game, which had been close, by resignation.

Diagram 105 shows the relevant situation. I was playing white and an endgame to decide a half point win was in progress. Black played the diagonal move of 1, but actually, the correct move was the connection at a. I immediately cut here.




Diagram 106

Diagram 106 ensued. Defending at black 3 was unavoidable, and now white hanged inward at 4.




Diagram 107

Here black's nine stones are locked in by a shortage of liberties, and resignation is the only option. That is, if black cuts at a, white plays b, black c, and white d.

Black had expected Diagram 107, where even if white cuts at a, black b, white c, black d, white e, and black is safe with f.

This is what black had read out. A shortage of liberties like this, if overlooked, will prove fatal, so when playing a killer be especially careful where one's stones end up.

One more thing one must pay attention to is the adjustment of the shape of one's stones. As pointed out in the technique section, if one gives a killer the opportunity, one will find the vital points in one's groups attacked and the shape destroyed. If the shape is destroyed, then, if the group is attacked, one must not only spend extra effort to defend it, but the eye shape also tends to be lost. Even if one must take *gote* to organize one's shape, one has to expend the move to settle one's group.

Usually during a game, each side hurries to take sente, leaving thin shape as it is in order to rush to a big point. However, taking *gote* to enhance one's group's shape is comparable to what is called in military parlance *regrouping for an attack*. At the moment it seems slow, but in the future it will assume positive aspects. Particularly when one's adversary is a killer, one should adopt the course of cautiously settling the shape one's formations.

With this mind set established, one can proceed with one's maneuvers, heading into middle-game fighting, but there are three essential defenses against a "killer" one should know about.

(1) Do Not Approach Strong Positions

A player who made big bets on his games was asked the trick to winning —

"Do not approach strong positions,"

— he instructed, and, yes indeed, if one only plays opponents weaker than oneself, one should not lose.

Nevertheless, this exhortation not to approach strong positions is a go proverb, the significance being that it is not good to place one's stones next to strong ones of the opponent.

In short, if the opponent builds an imposing wall, one should not play close by, but as far away as possible.

"Do not use thickness to make territory," — is another go proverb.

An iron clad precept of go indicates that if one has built a powerful wall, one must drive the opponent's stones towards it in an attack. Playing in reverse, outward from a wall in order to build territory, shows that one's thinking is backwards.

It follows that if one plays close to a wall, one's stones will get sandwiched right away against that wall in an attack vigorously pressed. At rate, one is fighting on the opponent's ground, so nothing good will come of it. When one has finally secured life for one's group, the other side has built another grand wall.




Diagram 108

Diagram 108 clarifies matters. The shape in the lower right corner results from a 5-4 stone attack against a stone on the 3 - 4 point.

With the circumstance of white's thickness in the lower right, black's two space extension is correct.

If there was nothing in the lower right, black 1 would usually be played one space wider, at a. However, in this case, white has a solid wall, so moving closer is dangerous. White would instantly slice in between with b, forcing black into a difficult fight.

For these reasons one must give wide berth to the opponent's thickness, but beginners often fret too much about this, and approach with absurd recklessness, fashioning their own plight. This is exactly like a moth flying into a flame. This gives a

"killer" an ideal target, so please be cautious not to afford the opponent a chance to brandish the full power of a wall.

(2) Effectively Sacrificing Positions

When you are playing go, do you say —

"What is the best way to discard those stones?" — taking pains over the decision?

Those who answer yes are wonderful players. As one's skill at go increases, one takes greater pains over the way one throws stones away. In the fully annotated game between the two masters, Shusai and Karigane, the challenge match game in Part III, it was clear the extent of the pains Karigane took in discarding his large group of stones. Those stones could have lived simply. had it been deemed earlier that such a course in itself was best. But those stones were deliberately abandoned for capture, and used as bait to make profit somewhere else. A go proverb states —

"Capture stones and lose the game,"

— meaning that when one captures stones that have been skillfully sacrificed, the result is that one ends in swiping honey.

What I would like to stress in this section is that even if one has not from the start planned and played sacrifice stones, if the prospects for life of a group of stones are judged poor, or else, if escaping successfully with a group means that in so doing one's other positions will suffer great damage, even if making a sacrifice goes against one's initial intention, one has to reevaluate the situation to determine the best way to discard those stones before the loss becomes too great.

Referring to the killing technique in the prior section —

"Discard the calf, unfattened,"
— is the opposite side of the coin.

When an opponent singles out a calf to fatten nicely and dress for the rotisserie, one must resist the impulse to try to drag it to safety, instead, utilizing the stones effectively as a sacrifice.

For instance, in exchange for the abandoned stones, one might wrap the opponent's stones up and squeeze, creating thickness, or else obtain an exchange (furikawari) in another area, or in a ko fight, get two plays in a row elsewhere.

The important thing is to avoid getting caught up in the tempo of a "killer's" moves, running with the calf hither and yon.

When we professional players get together, the focus of our discussion is always the question of heavy and light stones.

Making stones heavy is something we professionals avoid like the plague. That is because once those stones become heavy, they are difficult to throw away. Light stones can at any time be discarded in easy conscience. One goes with the flow, with no necessity to put up unyielding resistance.

The reason an opponent can launch into leaning tactics and two-pronged attacks is also as a result of one's stones becoming heavy and difficult to give up. Thus, the key in defending oneself against a "killer" is to above all refrain from making heavy stones.

Or else, if by chance one's stones do end up heavy, a target, not easily secured, one must courageously bite the bullet and aim towards sacrificing them.

One must find the best way to effectively sacrifice one's position...

(3) Welcome! The Killer of Go!

Here we begin the summation.

Ultimately, the "killer of go" embodies the thrill of the game and, if successfully carried out, the most efficient winning method, without doubt.

However, always aiming from the start to kill the opponent's groups of stones as soon as the thought strikes is a wayward course.

Using an analogy from baseball, if a player always decides beforehand to hit home runs, standing in the batter's box means looking for individual statistics, not team play. By stubbornly striving only for home runs, one's hitting percentage declines, and the same thing happens in go.

It is quite alright for the "killer" to have that nickname. Frankly speaking, without powerful fighting strength, that nickname would never be given. Possessing formidable vision and reading skills, the "killer" earns that reputation and is feared by the community of go players.

But striving to realize a "kill" with every game draws one ever deeper into that wayward course. Playing for thickness, chopping apart the opponent's position whenever possible, these things lead to a wide open game, and as a strategy, certainly may be countenanced. Still, this approach must be strictly adhered to in order to succeed.

When standing in the batter's box, one may have the intention of making a safety bunt (a half point win), but if one gets a good pitch that one can hit just right, one swings away with all one's might, going to hit it outside the park - this is the ideal home run. In go, "killing" must also follow this model.

Consequently, when the opponent is just as strong as one is, it is no good to incessantly try to kill large groups of stones, and boast of the effort. It is all well and good for others to proclaim one a "killer" and tremble at the thought, but for one to conduct a PR campaign and declare, "I'm the killer of go!" is an error. It is a wayward thought and a double-edged sword.

One must quietly hold one's saber in hand, and if the opponent makes a mistake, at that instant, without attracting attention or making a sound, bring the blade down with stunning force. One cannot count on winning every game by resignation. It is just as good to play a close game, and by pouncing on mistakes using extraordinary vision and reading, win midway through.

For these reasons one should by no means shy away from a "killer". My recommendation is that the reader welcome the "killer" with open arms. If the opponent is a splendid "killer", after one's stones are killed one can ask why those stones died and which move was bad. This is an invaluable lesson for the reader, a lesson to be cherished, even if paying a tutoring fee for it.

Also, if it is a two-bit "killer" confronting one, by exercising the superior vision and reading skills one has developed, one can deftly lure the "killer's" own group of stones to destruction. In Part IV the techniques of killing were discussed. Wouldn't it be interesting if the "killer" found those same tricks of the trade used to turn the tables?

The upshot would be that, as detailed in Part II concerning the pluses and minuses of killing, an unreasonable attempt to kill will result in overwrought shape (*amari-gatachi*). Compare this term from sumo wrestling: a floating center of gravity. "Chasing a deer, the hunter is blind to the mountains," and ignores the thinness of his own position to initiate an encircling attack. When a counterattack comes, the hunter gets routed.

This "killer" is a weak one, and for that very reason can be killed in turn. That is because the attack comes from a position full of holes. But in this case, one does not threaten to kill; instead the attitude is —

"I'm scared of the killer!"

— so to speak, starting off by giving the opponent a good target, and just as the attack begins stretching thin, one suddenly counterattacks, cutting the foe down with a stroke.

There is a classic comic sketch (*rakugo*) entitled: "Scary Sweet Rolls (*manju*)". The comic recites the tale of a sorry soul who is terrified of sweet rolls. A gang of miscreants in the village, corner the fellow in a room and start pelting him with sweet

rolls. At first he shouts with terror, but as time passes he grows quiet. The gang, puzzled, peek in the room and find the chap patting his bloated stomach and licking sweet rolls off his lips.

Grinning at the gang, he says —
"Now I'm scared of tea!"
— or so the story goes.

I am pleased that the reader is a fan devoted enough to go to peruse the material this far. Now, please take this final counsel to heart and welcome the "killer of go". The splendid "killer" will oblige you and kill your stones, instructing you about your weak points, which is fine, and the sham "killer" will let you eat your fill of sweet rolls, which is also fine. And then, before you know it, you will yourself will be hailed —

"That one's strong. That's a real 'killer',"
— armed with fearsome strength in go that demands respect.
That is my hope.

However, it is also my fervent hope that the reader achieve consummate success by using sound moves, and only swing for the outside-the-park home run when given the perfect pitch, only then.

In closing, I will leave you with a go lover's song that has been passed on to us from olden times.

"If taking stones rules your heart, unreasoning gulps, wash one to defeat; so much is known"

"Discarding stones with the strategy to play elsewhere that art will readily triumph"

"Know to add the profit, subtract the loss, ever and always avoid the clumsy capture of stones"

Edited by Mihori Masa

About the Author

Sakata Eio, Honorary Honinbo

Born February 15, 1920 in Tokyo. Became a disciple of Masubuchi Tatsuko 7 dan in 1929. Shodan in 1935, 2 dan the same year, 3 dan in 1937, 4 dan in 1938, 5 dan in 1940, 6 dan in 1943. 7 dan in 1948, 8 dan in 1952. Became the third player to become 9 dan at the Nihon Kiin (after Fujisawa Hosai and Go Seigen) in 1955. Won the Oteai six times, the Top Position Title three times, the Strongest Player Title twice. In 1961 he defeated Takagawa Kaku to become the 16th Honinbo. Held the title for seven straight years, earning the title of Honorary Honinbo. In 1963 he defeated Fujisawa Shuko in the Second Meijin Title Match to become the first modern Meijin-Honinbo. Held the title two terms. In 1964 amassed a record of 30 wins and 2 losses, capturing the Meijin, Honinbo, Nihon Kiin Championship, Pro Best Ten, Oza, Nihon Kiin Number One, NHK Cup, in total seven titles (failing only to take the 10 Dan Title). Holder of the 10 Dan Title five times, Nihon Kiin Championship 12 times (qualifying for the title of Honorary Nihon Kiin Champion), Pro Best Ten three times, Oza seven times, Nihon Kiin Number One four times, NHK Cup 11 times (qualifying for the title of Honorary NHK Cup Champion), JAA Cup twice, as well as many others, totaling 64 titles. Has also been awarded a number of cultural honors from government and private foundations.